On the Quantity of the Soul

Aurelius Augustine

4th century

BOOK ONE ON THE QUANTITY OF THE SOUL

Something about the country of the soul (1, 1 - 2, 3)

What is happening

1. 1. EVODIUS. Since I see you abound in leisure, I beseech you to answer me about the things that move me, not, as I think, intrusively and inappropriately. For often when I had asked many things from you, I don't know by what Greek sentence you thought to deter me, by which we are forbidden to seek those things which are above us: but now I do not think that we ourselves are above ourselves. Therefore, when I ask about the soul, I am not worthy to hear: What is above us, what is to us? but perhaps I am worthy to hear what we are.

AUGUSTINE List briefly what you would like to hear about the soul.

E. I will do it: for these things have been prepared for me by long thought. I ask, then, where the soul is, what it is, how much it is, why it was given to the body, and when it comes to the body, what kind is it made of, what kind of thing is it when it leaves?

The soul is from God...

1. 2. A. When you ask where the soul comes from, I am forced to understand two things. For we say differently whence a man is, desiring to know what his country is; otherwise, whence it is, when we inquire whence it consists, that is, of what elements and things it is composed. What do you want to know when you ask where the soul comes from? You wish to know both, as it were, his region and the country from which he came here; or indeed what is its substance, you ask

E. Indeed, I would like to know both, but what he knows must be known first, to commit to your bad judgment.

A. I believe that the proper habitation and country of the soul is God himself, by whom it was created. But I cannot name its substance: for I do not think that it is of those usual and known natures, which we touch with these bodily senses. For I think that the soul consists neither of earth, nor of water, nor of air, nor of fire, nor of all these, nor of any combination of these. But just as if you were to ask me, those trees from which it consists, I would name those four well-known elements, from which all such things must be believed to consist; Furthermore, if you were to go on searching, whence the earth itself, or water, or air, or fire, I would find nothing to say. If you ask again about the body, I will refer to those four elements; but to the inquirer concerning the soul, since it seems to be a simple thing and of its own substance, I am no more attached to it than if you were asking, as has been said, whence the earth is.

E. How you would like it to have its own substance, when you say it was made by God, I do not understand.

A. I cannot deny how the earth itself was made by God; and yet I cannot say, of what, as other bodies, the earth consists. For the earth is a simple body, in that it is

the earth; and therefore it is called the element of all these bodies, which are made of the four elements. Therefore, the sentence in which we say that the soul was made by God and has a certain nature of its own is not opposed to itself . For this particular nature of his, and his own, was made by God himself, as fire, as air, as water, as earth, by which the rest of all these were composed.

... and she is like God and immortal.

2. 3. E. In the meantime, I receive from where the soul is, that is, from God, which I will consider diligently with myself, and if anything moves me, I will seek after it. Wherefore, I pray thee, explain what it is.

A. It seems to me that he is like God. For, if I am not mistaken, you ask about the human soul.

E. It is the same thing that I would like you to explain, how the soul is like God; since we believe that God was made by no one, but the soul was said above to be made by God himself.

A. What? Do you think that it was difficult for God to make something like himself, when you see that this is also granted to us in such a variety of images?

E. But we seem to make mortals, but God made an immortal soul, as I think, unless perhaps it seems to you otherwise.

A. Therefore would you like such things to be done by men as God made them?

E. I would not really say this. But just as the immortal himself did something to the immortal in his own likeness; so also we, having been made immortal by God, ought to be immortal in our likeness.

A. You would rightly say, if you were to paint a picture of him, that you believe to be immortal in you: but now you express in it the likeness of a body, which is certainly mortal.

E. How then am I like God, since I can make no immortality like him?

A. How can not even the image of your body be as powerful as your body is? so it is not to be wondered at if the soul has not such a power as that in whose likeness it was made.

The soul is not in bodily quantity (3, 4 - 14, 24)

The quantity of the soul is not corporeal...

3. 4. E. And this is enough for the meantime: tell me now how great the soul is.

A. How do you ask how big it is? For I do not understand whether you require its breadth or length, or strength, or all these together; would you like to know how much it is worth? For we are accustomed to ask how tall Hercules was, that is, how many feet his height was extended. And also how great a man he was, that is, of what power and virtue.

E. I want to know both about the soul.

A. But that cannot be said above, nor can it be understood at all about the soul . For the soul is not to be suspected in any way, either long, or broad, or as if strong: these are corporeal, as it seems to me; and thus we inquire of the soul from the habits of bodies. And therefore it is well commanded even in the mysteries to despise all corporeal things, and to renounce all this world, which, as we see, is corporeal, whosoever desires to render himself such as he was made by God, that is, like God: for there is no other salvation for the soul. or renewal, or reconciliation to its author. Therefore I cannot answer you according to this inquiry as to what the soul is; but I can affirm that she was neither long, nor broad, nor robust, nor any of these things which are usually sought for in the measurements of bodies. And why I think this, I will give you an account, if you please.

E. It pleases me indeed, and I eagerly await it: for it seems to me that the soul is nothing if there is none of these things.

A. First, then, if it appears, I will show you that there are many things which you cannot say are nothing, and yet you cannot find in them any such spaces as you require in the soul; length, or something like that; but he is the more precious and to be esteemed the more, because he has none of these things. Then we shall see whether he really has none of these things.

E. Use in whatever order and manner you wish, I am ready to listen and learn.

... as also of justice.

4. 5. A. You do right: but I want you to answer my question; for perhaps you yourself already know what I am trying to teach you: for I believe you will not doubt that this tree is nothing at all.

E. Who would have doubted

A. What is that? Do you doubt that justice is much better than this tree?

E. This is indeed ridiculous, as if there were any comparison.

A. You deal liberally with me; but now pay attention to that: since it is so evident that this tree is worse than justice, that it does not even seem comparable to you, and you have confessed that this tree is nothing; would you like us to believe that justice itself is nothing?

E. Who will believe this madman?

A. Quite right: but perhaps this tree therefore seems to you to be something which is long for its own kind, and broad and strong; which if you withdraw, it will be nothing.

E. It seems so.

A. What then? Justice, which you have confessed to be nothing, nay, something far more divine than this and far more excellent, does it seem to you to be long?

E. In no way can justice meet me, either long, or wide, or something like that.

A. If, then, justice is none of these, and yet justice itself is nothing; Why does the soul seem nothing to you unless it has some length?

E. Come; Now it does not seem to me that there is any soul from it, because it is neither long, nor broad, nor strong, but whether it is really so, you know that it has not yet been said by you. For it is possible that there are many things to be highly valued which these lack; but I do not think that the soul should be believed to be immediately of this kind.

The soul is not wind or air.

4. 6. A. I know that this remains to be explained to us, and I had promised to explain this hereafter: but because it is a very subtle matter, and it seeks far different eyes of the mind than the human custom is wont to have in the acts of daily life; I exhort you to proceed willingly through the things through which I think you should be led, and not to be wearied by our somewhat necessary circuit, but to bear with difficulty a little slower to arrive at what you desire. For I ask you first, do you think that there is any body that does not have some length, breadth, and height according to its proper form?

E. I do not understand what you mean by height.

A. I mean that by which the interior of the body is thought of, or even felt, if it is transparent like glass; although if you put this down to bodies, as far as I am concerned, they can neither be felt, nor properly thought to be bodies at all. I want you to tell me what you think.

E. I do not at all doubt that all bodies cannot be without these.

A. What is that? can you think that these three are not only in bodies?

E. I don't understand how they can be anywhere else.

A. Then you do not think that the soul is different from the body?

E. Even if we confess that the wind is a body, I cannot deny that the body appears to me to be the soul: for I think that it is something like that.

A. Indeed, I grant that the body is wind, as if you were asking me about a wave. For we feel that this air is nothing else but that the air is moved and agitated by the wind; which can be approved in a very quiet place, and very still from all winds, or with a short fan, with which we stir the air even while driving away the flies, and feel it blowing. When there is a more secret movement of heavenly or earthly bodies through a great space of the world, it is called wind, and from different parts of the sky it is given different names. Or does it seem different to you?

E. As for me, nothing, and I accept that what you say is probable: but I said that the soul was not the wind itself, but something like that.

A. Tell me first, whether you perceive the very wind of which you have mentioned to have any length, breadth, and height. Then we shall see whether such a thing is the soul, so that in this way we can also investigate how much it is.

E. What can be easily found farther, wider, and deeper in this air, which I am now persuaded by you to be the wind that has moved me?

What is the true quantity of the soul is inquired into.

5. 7. A. You say rightly: but do you really think that your soul exists except in your body?

E. I think so.

A. Only inwardly, so as to fill a bottle; or only externally, like a roof; Or do you think that it is both intrinsic and extrinsic?

E. I think this is the last thing you asked for. For if it were not intrinsic, nothing in our bowels would be regarded as vital; unless it were externally, he could not even feel a slight pricking on the skin.

A. What more, then, do you inquire as to the size of the soul, when you see that it is as large as the very spaces of the body allow?

E. If reason teaches this, I require nothing more.

A. You are right to ask no more than reason teaches. But does this system seem the most reliable to you?

E. When I do not find another, it seems. For I will ask in its own place, that which moves me much, whether this figure remains the same when the body has passed away: for I remember that I put this last among the things to be discussed. But since to inquire about the number of souls, it seems to me that it pertains to the quantity, I do not think that it should be passed over at this point.

A. You do not think that it is incongruous, but first we will explain the extent of what still moves me, if it pleases me, so that I too may learn something, if you are already satisfied.

E. Ask as you will; for this feigned doubt of yours makes me very truly doubt about this very thing which I had already presumed to be accomplished.

Memory is not in space...

5. 8. A. Tell me, I beseech you, whether that which is called memory does not seem to you an empty name.

E. To whom can this be seen?

A. Do you think this is of the soul, or of the body?

E. And hence it is ridiculous to doubt. For what? Can it be believed, or understood, that an inanimate body remembers something?

A. Do you finally remember the city of Milan?

E. I remember very well.

A. Now that his deeds are mentioned, do you remember how great and what they were like?

E. I remember of course, and nothing more recent and complete?

A. So now you don't see it with your eyes, you see it with your mind.

E. It is so.

A. You remember, I believe also, that the fourth part of the world is now far from us.

E. Yes, and I remember this.

A. You therefore see in your mind the very distance of the places.

E. Video

A. Since then your soul is here where the body is, and does not extend beyond its space, as the above reason showed, how does it come about that it sees everything?

E. I think this is done by memory, not that it is present in those places:

A. Therefore, the images of those places are contained in the memory.

E. I think so: for I do not know what is going on there now; which of course I would not be ignorant of, if my mind extended to those places, and felt its presence.

A. You seem to me to be telling the truth: but surely these are images of bodies.

E. It must be so: for cities and lands are nothing but bodies.

... as also the soul.

5. 9. A. Have you never looked into a small peephole, or have you never seen your face in the pupil of a stranger's eye?

E. Yes, often.

A. Why is it much shorter than it appears?

E. For what else would you like than to be seen as a mirror?

A. It is necessary, therefore, that the images of bodies, if the bodies in which they appear are small, appear small.

E. Absolutely not.

A. Why, then, since the soul is in such a small space as is its body, can such great images be expressed in it, that cities, and the breadth of the earth, and all other vast

things can be imagined with it? For I want you to think a little more carefully about how much and how much our memory contains, which of course are contained in the soul. Who, then, is the bottom, which gulf, what immensity can contain these things, since the higher reason seems to have taught it as much as the body?

E. I do not find what to answer, nor can I sufficiently explain how much these things move me: and I laugh at myself a great deal, who had so quickly consented to a superior reason, as to conclude from this mode of the body what the soul is.

A. Does it not seem to you, then, that such a thing is what you like?

E. By no means: for even if this air, which is probably believed to be a wave of wind, can fill this whole world, the soul can imagine innumerable such and so many worlds with it, which images I cannot guess in what space it contains.

A. See, then, that it is not better to believe that it is, as I said above, neither long, nor broad, nor high, as you have granted me in justice.

E. I would readily agree, were it not that it troubled me more, that, again, by agreement, the innumerable images of so many spaces cannot be taken by any of its own length, breadth, and height.

Which is a mere quantity.

6. 10. A. We shall perhaps find this as far as possible, if we first carefully discuss these three, that is, length, breadth, and height. And so he began to think of length, which had not yet assumed any breadth.

E. I can think of nothing of this kind: for if I set up in my mind a spider's thread, by which we are wont to see anything more remote; It also occurred to me in it, however, that the length itself, and the width, and the height: whatever they may be, I cannot deny their existence.

A. Your answer is not at all absurd, but surely when you understand that these three are in the spider's thread, you distinguish these things, and do you know how they differ from each other?

E. Why do we know what they differ from? Or else could I see that none of these are missing from this thread?

A. Therefore, with which understanding you have distinguished these things, you can also, after separating them, think only of length, if you do not turn any body in your mind: for whatever it is, it will not lack all these things. For it is incorporeal that I now wish you to understand: for length alone can only be understood by the mind, it cannot be found in the body.

E. I understand now.

A. Therefore, if you would like to cut this length in thought by length, you see that it is certainly not possible: for if it is possible, there is also breadth.

E. It is obvious.

A. Therefore, if it pleases you, we will call this mere and simple length a line: for by this name it is usually called by many scholars.

E. Call it what you will: for I need not trouble about names, when the matter is open.

A figure is made of a line or lines.

6. 11. A. You do well, and I not only approve, but also advise, that he always prefers to take care of things rather than words. But this line, which I think you well understand, if it is extended either from one side or from both sides, as long as it can be extended, you see that there is no end. Or is your mental edge less capable of contemplating this?

E. I am completely contemplative, and nothing is easier.

A. You see, then, that no shape can be made, if nothing else is done than to extend that line.

E. I do not yet understand what figure you mean.

7. 11. A. Meanwhile, I call a figure, when some space is enclosed by a line or lines, as if you were to make a circle, or join four lines to themselves at their ends

so that the end of no one was free from the coupling of another.

E. What figure do you mean, I think I see myself now; but I wish I could so well see where these things tend, or what you are going to produce from them, that I may know what I require of the soul.

Reason must be sought.

8. 12. A. I reminded you of this at the beginning, and requested that you should patiently bear our circuit for some time, which I also beseech you to do. It is not a light thing to ask, not an easy thing to know: for we want to know this clearly and hold on to it, if possible. For it is one thing to believe in authority, and another with reason. To believe in authority is a great compendium, and no trouble: for if it pleases thee, thou mayest read many things which great and godly men of these things, which seemed necessary, spoke healthily to the ignorant, as if by a sort of nod, and they desired to be believed by those whose minds were either slower or

There could be no other way of salvation more complicated. For such men, of whom there is certainly a great multitude, if they wish to grasp the truth by reason, are very easily deceived by the similitudes of reason, and so slip into various and harmful opinions, that they either never emerge from it and are freed, or with great difficulty. Therefore it is most useful for these to believe in the most excellent authority, and to live according to this. If you think it safer, I will not only resist nothing, but I will approve much. But if you cannot control that desire, with which reason you have convinced yourself to arrive at the truth, you must endure many and long circuits, so that no reason will bring you, except what only reason can say, that is true reason; and not only true, but so certain, and free from all semblance of falsity, if these things can be discovered by man in any way, that no false or plausible arguments can be carried away from you.

E. I will no longer miss anything in advance: let reason act and lead as it pleases, as long as it leads.

What is the shape of three equal lines...

8. 13. A. God will do this, who is to be supplicated either for such things alone, or at least for these things chiefly. But let us return to what I had planned. For if you already know what a line is and what a figure is, tell me what I ask of you, that is, do you think that any figure can be made if a line is drawn from both sides or from the other through infinity?

E. I do not confirm that this can be done in any way.

A. So what must be done to make a figure?

E. What, unless that line is not infinite, and is drawn into a circle, so that it touches itself on the other side? for I do not see how any space can otherwise be concluded from one line; unless it is done, according to your description, there will be no figure.

A. What if I want to make a figure with straight lines? can it be made of one line, or not?

E. No way.

A. What, two?

E. Not even this.

A. What, three?

E. I see that it is possible.

A. You know well, then, and hold that, when a figure is to be made with straight lines, less than three cannot be. Or if any reason is contrary to you, will he call you out of this opinion?

E. Clearly, if someone showed me that this was false, there would be nothing I could trust to know.

A. Now answer that, how do you make a figure with three lines?

E. When they join each other at the ends.

A. What? where they join, does it not seem to you that a corner is formed?

E. It is so.

A. Then how many angles does this figure consist of?

E. As many lines.

A. What? Do you make the lines even or odd?

E. Pares

A. What? Are all the angles equally open, or is one narrower or more open than another?

E. I also see them as equals.

A. Is it possible that there should be odd angles in a figure which is formed by three straight and equal lines? Or can't he?

E. By no means at all.

A. What? if it consists of three straight lines, but an odd figure, can the angles be even in these, or do you understand something else?

E. They cannot at all.

A. You say rightly: but tell me, please, which figure seems better and more beautiful to you? Is it composed of even or odd lines?

E. Who doubts that it is better in which equality prevails?

... and four

9. 14. A. So do you prefer equality to inequality?

E. I do not know whether he does not prefer anyone .

is perfect with three equal angles , what is in it the opposite of the angle, that is, it is placed opposite on the other side; whether a line or an angle.

E. I see a line.

A. What then? if an angle is opposite to an angle, and a line is opposite to a line, do you not admit that equality is more important in that figure in which it occurs?

E. I confess indeed, but I do not see at all how this can be done in three lines .

A. What? Can this be done in four lines?

E. It is absolutely possible.

A. A figure is better, therefore, which consists of four equal straight lines, than that which consists of three.

E. It is certainly better, since equality is more valid in it.

A. What then? the same as four straight equal lines

trusts, do you think that it can be done in such a way that all the angles in it are not equal, or do you not think so?

E. I see that it is possible.

A. In what way?

E. If two are more contracted, let two be more open.

A. Do you also see how both more contracted and both more open are contrary to each other?

E. And most truly and most openly.

A. You see, therefore, that even here, as much equality as could be preserved, was preserved: for you see surely that it is impossible for a figure to be completed with four equal lines, either not all, or certainly not even two angles being equal; and yet things that are equal must answer to each other on the contrary.

E. I see, and hold very firmly.

Justice is in equality.

9. 15. A. Is there nothing that moves you even in these matters of a certain justice so great and so unshakable?

E. In what way?

A. Because, as I think, we say that justice is nothing but equity: and equity seems to be called from a kind of equality. But what equity is there in this virtue, except that it should be given to each his own? Moreover, to each his own, they cannot be attributed except by a certain distinction. Or do you think otherwise?

E. It is obvious, and I completely agree.

A. What? do you suppose that there is no distinction, if all things are equal, so that they differ in nothing at all from one another?

E. No way.

A. Therefore justice cannot be preserved, except in the things in which it is preserved, there is a certain, so to speak, oddity and dissimilarity.

E. I understand.

A. When, then, we admit that these figures of which we are speaking are different from each other, namely, that which consists of three, and this which consists of four angles, when both are made of equal lines; Does it not seem to you a kind of restrained justice, that that which cannot have the parity of its opposites, should keep the equality of the angles unshaken: in this case, since the congruity of the opposites is so great, that law of angles admits some inequality? Since this, therefore, moved me a great deal, I thought it necessary to inquire of you in what manner this truth, equity, and equality should please me.

E. Now I see what you say, and I am not a little surprised.

A. Come now, because you rightly prefer equality to inequality, and there is no one, as I think, endowed with human sense, to whom this is not apparent; let us seek, if it pleases us, a figure in which the highest equality may be found: for whatever it may be, it will be preferred to the rest without doubt.

E. I like it, and I want to know what it is.

Not the same equality in squares and triangles.

10. 16. A. First, then, answer whether to you those figures, of which mention has already been made as far as seemed sufficient, do those appear to excel, which consist of four equal lines, and as many equal angles; for, as you see, in this both the equality of the lines and the angles is and what we did not find in that which is enclosed by three equal lines, there is an equality of opposites to this: for a line is a line, and an angle is opposite to an angle, as you see.

E. It is true, as you say.

A. Does it have total equality, or does it seem different to you? For if he has, we seek another in vain, so that we may institute; but if he has not, I want the same to be shown to me by you.

E. It seems to me that I have: for where both the angles are equal and the lines are equal, I do not see any inequality detected.

A. I think otherwise: for a straight line, until it comes to the corners, is endowed with the utmost equality; but when another line joins it from a different side, and makes an angle, do you not think that this itself is unequal? Does the part of the figure which is closed by the line seem to you to agree with that part which is closed by the angle?

E. By no means: and I am ashamed of my rashness; for I was led by the fact that I saw the angles in it equal to each other and the sides: but who does not see the great difference between their sides and the angles?

A. Take another very clear indication of inequality: for you certainly see that either that triangular figure is constant with equal lines, or that square has some mean.

E. I see clearly.

A. What? When we draw lines from the same center to all parts of the figure, do the lines drawn to you seem equal or odd?

E. They are quite odd: for they must be longer, which we bring into the corners.

A. How many are there in squares, and how many in triangles?

E. Four here, three there.

A. What? again, the smallest of all, and how many are there in each figure?

E. As many, that is, those which are drawn in the middle of the sides.

A. You seem to me to say very truly, that there is no need to tarry here any longer; for it is sufficient for what we want: for you see that a great equality is preserved here, as I think, and yet it is not yet perfect in all respects.

E. I see everything, and what that figure is which has the greatest equality, I eagerly expect to know.

Which of the dimensions is simpler?

11. 17. A. What do you think, except that whose extremity is congruent to itself on every side, disturbing the equality at no angle, and from whose center equal lines can be drawn to all parts of the extremity?

E. Now, as I think, I understand: for you seem to describe to me that figure which is terminated by a single line drawn into a circle.

A. You understand correctly. Now therefore consider that, since the above reasoning has taught that a line is to be understood in terms of length alone, and that nothing of breadth is to be used, and therefore that it cannot be divided by the length by which it is drawn, whether it seems to you that any figure can be found without breadth.

E. No way.

A. What? Can latitude itself have no length, although there is only latitude, just as above we understood length without width? Or can't he?

E. I see that it is not possible.

A. You also see, if I am not mistaken, that the width can be divided on every side, but the line cannot be along the length.

E. It is obvious.

A. Then what do you think is more important? that which can be divided, or that which cannot?

E. Of course that is not possible.

A. So you propose a line of width. For if something cannot be divided, it must be preferred; It is necessary to put before that which can be divided less: but latitude is divided from every part, but length is not except from a different part, for it does not admit of division by length: therefore latitude is superior. Or do you think otherwise?

E. So exactly reason compels us to confess as you say.

The point is very simple....

11. 18. A. Let us now inquire, if it pleases us, whether there is anything in this reason which cannot be divided at all; for this will be even better than that line. For you see that the line can be cut in innumerable different ways, so I leave it to you to discover this for yourselves.

E. I think that it cannot be divided, because we put the middle in the figure, whence the lines are drawn to the extremes. For if it is divided, it cannot lack length or even breadth. But if it has only length, it is no longer from whence the lines are drawn, but is the line itself. But if it is also wide, it needs another medium from which the lines of width are drawn to the extremes. But both of these reasons are rejected. It will therefore be that which cannot be divided.

A. You are right. But does it not seem to you something like that from which the line is drawn, even though there is not yet a figure whose mean we understand? For I mean the beginning of the line from which the length begins, which I want you to understand without any length. For if you understand length, you certainly do not understand where length itself begins.

E. Such at all.

A. This, then, which I see you now understand, is the most powerful of all that has been demonstrated. Indeed, this is the fact that he suffers no division; and it is called a point when it holds the middle of a figure; or when it marks something altogether which is to be understood without parts, and yet does not occupy the middle of the figure, it is called a sign. It is therefore a known sign without parts. Now there is a point, known as holding the middle of the figure. Thus it happens that every point is also a sign, but not every sign is seen as a point. For I want to agree among ourselves about these names, so that we may talk less about it in disputing: although most of them appeal to the point, not that the middle of every figure, but that which holds only a circle or a ball; although we have to work less with terms.

E. I agree.

... and that most powerful.

12. 19. A. You certainly see how much it is worth. For the line begins with him, and ends with him; We see that no figure can be formed by straight lines unless the angle itself is closed; then, wherever a line can be cut, it is cut through it, since it admits of no section at all; there is no line of the line unless it is joined by him. Finally, with the rest of the plane figures (for we have not yet said anything about the height), reason has shown that it is preferable to that which is enclosed in a circle, because of the greatest equality; What other control of equality is there than a point established in the middle? Much can be said about the power of this, but I will refrain and let you think more for yourself.

E. Of course it seems; for he will not hesitate to require me, if anything be more obscure: but I see, in moderation, as I think, that this sign has a great power.

How height is made.

12. 20. A. Now then pay attention to that, when you have seen what the sign is, and what the length is, and what the width is; What of these seems to you to be another's, and whose need, without which it cannot exist.

E. I see that breadth needs length, without which it cannot be fully understood. Again, the length does not need the width of the eye in order for it to be, but it cannot be without that sign. It is clear that this sign is by itself and does not need any of these.

A. It is so as you say: but consider more carefully, whether the width can really be cut on all sides; or in some places it cannot even admit a section, although it admits more than a line.

E. I don't know exactly why he can't.

A. I believe you do not remember; for there is no way you could not know this: wherefore I will remind you in this way. For certainly you understand the breadth in such a way that you do not usurp anything in your thoughts about the height.

E. Yes, absolutely.

A. Let the height therefore be added to this width, and now answer whether there is also something added, so that it can be cut off on all sides.

E. You have reminded me of the wonder at all. For now I see that a section can be admitted not only from above or below, but also from the sides, and that nothing at all remains, so that the division cannot penetrate. Wherefore it is manifest, that the breadth cannot be cut from these parts, by which the height is raised.

Which quantity should be thought of with the understanding.

12. 21. A. Because then, if I am not mistaken, the length, breadth, and height are known to you; I ask whether the two upper ones can be missing, where there is height.

E. Indeed, I see that without length there cannot be height, but without breadth it can.

A. Return, then, to the thought of breadth, and if you imagine it lying in your mind, let it be erected on each side, as if you wanted to bring it out through the thinnest crack where closed doors join. Do you still not understand what I mean?

E. I understand what you are saying, but perhaps not yet what you want.

A. That is, that you may answer, whether it seems to you that the latitude thus erected has migrated into height, and that the latitude has now lost its name and description; whether the width still remains, although it is thus placed.

E. It seems to me that the height is done.

A. Do you remember, please, how we defined height?

E. I remember clearly, and I am ashamed that I have already answered in this way. For even in this way, as if erected, the breadth does not admit of a section in a long downward direction: therefore no interiors can be thought of in it, although the middle and the ends are thought of. But according to the above demonstration of height, which you made me remember, there is no height at all, where nothing can be thought within.

A. You are right, and so I wished to remember you at all. Therefore I want you to answer that now, whether you put falsehood before truth.

E. Now to doubt this is incredible madness.

A. Tell me, I beseech you, whether there is a true line which can be cut along a length; or a true sign that can be cut in any way; or the true width, which, when erected, as we have said, admits of a section along a long downward direction?

E. Nothing less.

They stopped with a question.

13. 22. A. Have you ever seen with these corporeal eyes either such a point, or such a line, or such a width?

E. Absolutely never. For these are not corporeal.

A. But if corporeal things are seen by corporeal eyes in a strange kind of relationship; the mind by which we see these things must be incorporeal, not corporeal or corporeal. Or do you think otherwise?

E. Now, I grant that the body is not the mind or anything corporeal; what is it at last, tell me?

A. In the meantime, see whether it has been accomplished to deprive him of that quantity, about which the question is now: for what is the mind, I wonder that you have forgotten what was discussed between us in the previous question. For you remember that he asked you at first where he was from: that I remember that he was treated by us in two ways, one by which he was asked, as it were, from his country; on the other hand, whether it was from earth, or fire, or any other of these elements, or from all, or from some of these. In which question it was settled between us, that this was no more to be inquired of than whence the earth is, or if anything else of the individual elements. For it is to be understood that, although God made the mind, it has a definite substance, which is neither earthly, nor fiery, nor airy, nor moist; let it be But if you want the mind to be defined for you, and therefore you ask what the mind is; I answer easily. For it seems to me that there is a kind of substance that partakes of reason, adapted to the governing body.

The soul lacks the quantity that it understands...

14. 23. Therefore pay more attention to that, whence it is now ambiguous, whether there is any quantity and, as it were, local space in the mind. For surely because there is no body; for in no other way would any incorporeal thing be capable of seeing, as the above reason showed; beyond a doubt it lacks the space in which bodies are measured: and for this reason such a quantity cannot be rightly believed, or thought, or understood. But if it moves you, why does the memory contain so many spaces of heaven, earth, and sea, since it itself is of no size? it is a wonderful force, which, however, from what we have learned, you can perceive how much light is present in your genius. For if there is no body, as reason has already shown, that it lacks length, breadth, and height, and none of these can exist in a body except with the other two; yet it is permitted to the mind to see even a single line with a kind of interior eye, that is, the understanding: I think we must thus grant that the mind is not a body, so that it may be better than the body. This having been granted, I do not think that it should be doubted that he is also a better line: for it is ridiculous when those three things are said to the body to be a body, and not that he who is better in body is better than all these. But the very line, by which the mind is convinced that it is better, is therefore superior to the other two, because it can be cut less than those two. Moreover, these two are intersected more than a line, the more they extend themselves into space: but a line has no space except length, and when it is removed, nothing at all remains of space. Therefore, whatever line is better, it is necessary that there is no space, and that it cannot be divided or cut at all. In vain, then, as I think, we labor to find a quantity of spirit which is none, when we allow him to be a better line. And if the best of all plane figures is that which is formed by a circle, in which reason he taught that nothing is better than a point and more powerful, which without any doubt lacks sides; what wonder if the soul is neither corporeal, nor extended in length, or spread out in breadth, or solidified in height; and yet is it so strong in the body, that the government of all the members depends upon it, and as a kind of pivot in the action, of all the bodily motions?

... and he understands himself.

14. 24. But since the middle of the eye, which is called the pupil, is nothing else than a certain point of the eye, in which, however, there is so much power, that with it half the sky, of which there is an ineffable space, can be seen from some elevated place; it is not unlikely that the mind is deprived of the truth of all bodily size, which is consummated by these three differences, although any size of bodies can be imagined. But it is possible for a few to see the mind with the mind itself, that is to say that the mind itself sees itself; but he sees through the understanding. For this one alone may see that there is nothing in things more powerful and magnificent than those natures which, so to speak, are understood to be without swellings: for swelling is not absurdly called the size of the body, which if it were to be valued, elephants would certainly be wiser than us. But if any of their relatives should say that elephants are wise; for I felt that, although I was wondering, I also felt that people often wandered from here; that, as far as I think, at least he will admit, the bee is wiser than an ass; to compare the sizes of which is surely more than that of

an ass; whereupon she, flying so high, as to be difficult to see by us in such a light, was found to see a little hare hidden under a bush, and a fish under the waves. But if in the senses themselves, to which it is not given to feel anything but corporeal, the greatness of the body has nothing to do with the matter, that is, with the power of feeling; Is it to be feared, I pray thee, lest the human mind, whose superior and almost sole aspect is the very reason by which it endeavors to find itself, should be nothing, if the same reason, that is, itself, prevails to deprive it of all the greatness by which a place is obtained? Some great things, believe me, are great, but they are to be thought of without any weight of heart. This happens more easily to those who approach these things well-educated, not by the pursuit of empty glory, but kindled by the divine love of truth; or those who are already engaged in seeking these things, although they have come to investigate them less learned, if they patiently render themselves docile to the good, and turn themselves away from all the habits of the bodies, so far as is permitted in this life. But it cannot happen by some divine providence, that religious souls lack the opportunity to find themselves and their God, that is, those who seek the truth piously, chastely, and diligently.

Shall the soul grow with the body (15, 25 - 22, 40)

We provide a reason.

15. 25. But from this question, unless something still moves you, let us withdraw now, if it pleases you; and let us pass on to other things: but whatever we have perhaps discussed more eloquently about those figures than you wished, you will see how much it will be valid for others, if you allow that this discussion has been somewhat helped by it; , and not being able to endure it, he willingly fled into the same darkness from which he wished to flee; and he brings forward, if I am not mistaken, the most certain proofs, by which what has been discovered and accomplished, he has an impudent doubt, as far as man is permitted to trace such things. [A shameless doubt is known to occur in two ways: while either a man who can use reason is made so dull and lazy to seek the truth, that he prefers to remain in the darkness of vanity, rather than in that which has been established by his Creator for himself and his God by true reasoning to find out and to work; or such impious acts of defiance, which have been discovered and accomplished by others who diligently and piously seek them, doubt that they can be discovered and accomplished; which reason proves to be the most impudent kind of envy]. For I have less doubt about these things than about those which we see with these eyes, with the slime always waging war. For what is less to be borne and heard, than to confess that we perform reason to the beasts, and to confess that this thing is something which we perceive by bodily light, which even some beasts see better; But what we look at with reason, do we contend that there is nothing? If it were said to be such as that which the eyes see, surely nothing could be said more unworthy.

whether the reason grows with the body.

15. 26. E. I accept these very willingly and agree: but what moves me is that, when it comes to corporeal quantity, the fact that the soul is not a matter is so clear to me

that I do not know at all how I can resist those arguments, and what of them I will not concede. first, why with age, as the body grows, so the soul either grows or seems to grow. For who will deny that little children are not even comparable to some of the cunning of beasts? but who doubts that, as they grow, reason also grows in them in a certain way? Then, if the soul is extended through the space of its body, how is it of no size? but if it is not distended, how does it feel the sting everywhere?

A. You are asking about things which have often moved me too: therefore I am not prepared to answer you, as I usually do; but whether it is good, the reason which acts you will judge: whatever it may be, I certainly cannot do more, unless perhaps something better comes into my mind from God when we are disputing. But let us do it, if it pleases us, in our manner, so that you may answer for yourself by reason. And first let us inquire whether there is a certain proof of the mind growing with the body, that with the approach of age a man is more adapted to human habits, and is more and more expert in them.

E. Come as you please; for I also like that kind of teaching and learning the most: for I do not know how, when I myself answer what I was searching for without knowing it, the discovery itself becomes not only a matter of fact, but even sweeter with wonder.

The power that is the reason for life...

16. 27. A. Tell me, then, whether two things are greater and better for you, or do they seem to be one and the same thing called by two names?

E. I know that bigger is one thing, better is another.

A. Which of these two do you think is the quantity?

E. To be sure, that is what we say is greater.

A. What if we admit that the round square of two figures is better? Does quantity do that, or something else?

E. By no means quantity, but that of which we spoke above, equality, is the cause of this excellence.

A. Now then, pay attention to whether it seems to you that virtue is a kind of equality of life, agreeing on all sides with reason. For if one thing differs from another in life, we are more offended, if I am not mistaken, than if some part of the circle is at a greater or less distance from the point than the other parts. Or do you think otherwise?

E. Yes, I agree, and I prove that what has been described by you is a virtue: for reason is not to be said or thought, unless it is true; and whose life conforms in all things to the truth, he is certainly either the only one, or certainly the most, who

lives well and honestly; and he who is thus affected, alone must be judged to have courage, and to live by it.

A. You say well: but surely you also see that, as I think, the circle of plane figures is more similar in virtue to any other. For this is the reason why among Horace we are wont to extol with great praise that verse in which he says, when speaking of a wise man,

Strong and in itself all smooth and round 1.

And rightly so: for neither do you find anything in the good of the soul, which is more agreeable to itself in all respects than virtue; nor in plain figures but a circle. Therefore, if a circle does not guarantee the size of the space, but a certain confirmation of the rest; how much more is virtue to be thought of, that it overcomes the other affections of the mind, not by the occupation of a greater place, but by a certain divine congruity of reasons and concord?

... the spirit grows.

16. 28. But when a child makes commendable progress, to what thing is he said to make more progress than to virtue? does it not seem to you?

E. It is obvious .

A. Therefore it should not appear to you that the mind, like the body, grows and advances with age: for in progressing it reaches virtue, which we admit is beautiful and perfect, not by the size of space, but by the great force of constancy : and if one thing is greater, another is better, as you have already given; whatever the soul advances with age, and becomes in control of reason, it seems to me that it does not become greater, but better. But if the size of the members did it; Every one would be more prudent, the taller or stronger he is: you will deny, I think, that he has no other way.

E. Who denied this? But still, when the soul advances through age, you also allow it; I wonder who can become an expert of every size, even if not in the space of his limbs, but certainly with the help of time.

It is not extended by age and time...

17. 29. Cease to be surprised, for here also I answer you in a similar way. For as the size of the limbs therefore brings no argument why it helps the soul, because many are found to be more prudent with shorter and shorter limbs than some endowed with a great mass of body; therefore, since we see the younger some more industrious and active than the older, I do not see why it should be thought that spaces of time should be given to the increase of ages as to bodies, so to souls; since the bodies themselves, which have been allowed to grow over time and to occupy larger spaces, are often older and shorter, not only senile, which contract and diminish with the greatness of time; but also of the boys, whom we have observed to be shorter in body than those who are older in age. If, therefore, they are prolonged for a great deal of time, they do not even give cause to the greatness of

the bodies themselves; but all that is the power of the seed, and some of the numbers of nature are certainly hidden and difficult to discern: how much less is it to be supposed that the soul becomes longer in a long time, because we see that it has learned a great deal by the use of things and assiduousness?

... greatness of mind.

17. 30. But if that moves you, what we are accustomed to interpret as what the Greeks call long-suffering; It may be observed that many words are transferred from the body to the mind, just as from the mind to the body: for if Virgil said of the impious mountain and the most just earth, which words you see are transferred from the mind to the bodies; What wonder if we say long-suffering in turn, since long-suffering can only be long-suffering? But that among the virtues which is called the greatness of the soul, is rightly understood to be related to no space, but to a certain force, that is, to the power and power of the soul; Virtue is to be valued the more, the more it despises. But we shall speak of this hereafter, when we inquire how great the soul is, as it is usual to inquire, how great Hercules was, the excellence of his deeds, not the mass of his limbs: for thus we have distributed them above. Now it is necessary for you to remember that we have already dealt sufficiently with the point: for reason taught that it was the most powerful, and that it was to be mastered most of all in figures. Do not power and dominion display a certain greatness? and at that point we could not find any space. Therefore, when we hear or speak of a great or huge mind, we must think about how much space it occupies, but how much it can do. Therefore, if your first argument, in which it seemed to you that the mind grows with the body through age, has already been sufficiently discussed; let us pass on to another thing.

How a child achieves speech.

18. 31. E. I do not know whether all that was wont to move me in vain, we were persecuted; and it is possible that some may escape my recollection: nevertheless, what comes to mind now let us see what it is like, that the child does not speak as an infant, and is caught up in growing up.

A. That is easy: for I believe it seems to you that everyone speaks the language in which the people among whom he was born and brought up speak.

E. No one is ignorant of it.

A. Establish, then, some one born and raised there, where men would not speak, but would sign their own thoughts by nodding and moving their limbs; Do you not think that he will do such things, and will not speak, who has heard no one speak?

E. I do not want you to ask me this, because it cannot be done. For who are such men, among whom I can think of any one born?

A. Did you not see in Milan a young man of the most respectable body and the most elegant manners, yet mute and so deaf that he could neither understand others except by the movement of his body, nor himself express what he wished otherwise? for here is the best known. For I know a certain talkative countryman, by a talkative wife, who begat children, all male and female, about four, or more (for I do not remember enough now), mute and deaf. For because they could not speak, they were mute; and from the fact that they gathered no signs except with their eyes, even the deaf were understood.

E. But I know him well, and I do not know about those whom I believe you: but why this?

A. Because you said that you could not imagine being born among such people.

E. Nor now do I say anything else: for you grant that these, if I am not mistaken, were born among those who would speak.

A. Indeed, I would not have denied it: but since it is already established among us that there may be some such men; Think, please, if a man and a woman of this race were united, and brought into some wilderness, where they were still able to live, if they were to give birth to a son who was not deaf, how would he speak to his parents?

E. In what manner do you think that, except as his parents gave him, he would return the signs by such a gesture? But still a little boy could not even do this: therefore that reason of mine remains intact. For what does it matter whether one grows up to speak or to act, since both belong to the soul, which we do not want to admit to grow?

Whether we grow by art or by nature.

18. 32. A. Now you seem to me that even when everyone walks on a tightrope, it is believed that this person has a greater soul than those who are unable to do so.

E. This is another thing: for who does not see that this is art?

A. Why, please, art? or because he learned?

E. Yes indeed.

A. Why, then, does it seem to you that even if everyone learns something else, it is not an art?

E. Clearly, whatever is learned, I do not deny that it is art.

A. Did he not then learn to do the gesture from his parents?

E. He learned of course.

A. It is necessary, then, that you must grant that this too is not the growth of a larger soul, but that it is imitative of a certain art.

E. I cannot grant this.

A. Therefore, not all that is learned in art, as you have now admitted.

E. Art at all.

A. Then he did not learn the gesture, which you gave no less.

E. He learned, but this is not art.

A. But you said a little before that art is what is learned.

E. Come, I now grant, that both speaking and acting, by what we have learned, are art. However, there are other skills that we learn while we focus on others; others, which are inserted into us by our teachers.

A. Which of these souls do you think you will eventually gain from the fact that it becomes larger? are they all?

E. I think not all, but those above.

A. Doesn't this kind of thing seem like a tightrope walk to you? for seeing this also, as I think, those who do it achieve it.

E. I believe so: but still not all who look at these things and look at them with great interest can achieve them, but those who suffer the masters of this matter.

A. Well, of course you say; for I would also answer you this about speech: for many Greeks and another kind of language hear us speaking more often than they look at the funeral pyre. those who learn our language, as we wish to know theirs, are often given to teachers. These things being so, I wonder why you would ascribe what men speak to the growth of the soul; But you do not want them to walk on a rope.

E. I do not know how you confound these things: for he who is handed over to a teacher to learn our language, knows a certain other of his than that which his soul has grown, I think he has learned; But when he learns something else, I do not attribute it to a larger soul, but to art.

A. What if he, who was born among the dumb and tall, had learned to speak late and already as a young man by falling upon other people, when he knew no other language? At that time do you think his soul had grown, when he had learned to speak?

E. I never dared to say that; and now I yield to reason, and I do not think that what we are talking about is an argument for a larger soul, lest I force all other arts to admit that the soul has been obtained by growing; for if I say, that absurdity will follow, that the soul decreases when it forgets anything.

That is a triple type of growth.

19. 33. A. You understand well, and that you may hear the truth, it is rightly said that the soul learns to grow, and on the contrary to learn to diminish, but in a translated word, as we have shown above. However, we must be careful that it does not seem to occupy a larger area of the place, while it is said to grow; but the skilled man has a certain greater power to act than the unskilled man. However, it matters a great deal what those things are that he learns, by which he seems to increase in a certain way. For as there are three kinds of growth in the body, one is necessary, by which the natural harmony is fulfilled in the members; the second excess, by which something differs from the rest of the members by increasing their whole health, by which it sometimes happens that men are born with old fingers, and most other things, which, when they are excessive beyond the usual, are called monstrous; the third harm, when it occurs, is called swelling; for the members are also said to grow in this way, and in truth they occupy a larger place, but with conquered good health: thus in the mind there are certain natural growths, which are said to be increased by honorable disciplines adapted to a good and happy life. When, indeed, we learn those things which are more wonderful than useful; although in some cases they are generally expedient, yet they are superfluous, and they are to be reckoned of that second class. For if a certain piper, as Varro is the author of, so pleased the people that he became king, we ought not to think that our mind should be increased by that artifice: for they are not larger than a man's; killed But that class of arts, by which the health of the mind is preserved, is harmful: for to judge by the smell and taste of soups, and to know from which lake a fish has been caught, or to know how much wine it is, is a kind of pitiful skill. and when, by these arts, the soul seems to have grown, which, neglected by the mind, has sunk into the senses, nothing else is to be judged than that it has swelled or even congealed.

To learn is to remember.

20. 34. E. I accept these and agree, and yet I have no anxiety from the fact that the soul is ignorant of all things and brute, which we observe as much as possible in a newly born child. For why did he bring any art with him, if it is eternal?

A. You raise a very great, great question, and in which I do not know whether there is anything greater, in which our self-beliefs are so opposed, that it seems to me that you have brought with you no soul, contrary to all art; nor is that which is said to learn to be anything other than to remember and remember. But do you see how it is not at this time, whether they have such things to themselves, to require? For now we act so that it may appear, if possible, that it is not named according to the small or great spaces of the place; but the eternity of it, if there is any, we shall opportunely scrutinize with that which you put fourth. Why it was given to the body, we began to treat it as it is right. For what concerns such a quantity of it, whether it has always been or has not always been, or will be, or whether it is now inexperienced and now skilled; since we have proved above that for a long time, not even to bring the cause of greatness to bodies; and let it be well known that skill is not present in those who are growing, and often is appropriate for those who are

growing old; and many other words are sufficient, as I think, to show that not with the size of the body, which age brings, the soul also becomes larger.

The strength of the body grows...

21. 35. Wherefore let us see, if you please, what your second argument is, that the touch of the soul is felt throughout the whole space of the body, which we wish to be of no space.

E. I would leave it now to pass on to that, unless something should be said about the powers. For what is this, that bodies which increase in age give strength to larger souls, if the soul does not become larger with these? For although the strength of the soul is usually thought of as the strength of the body; yet I would never abjure them from the soul, when I see that there are none in inanimate bodies. Indeed, it is not to be denied that the soul is used by the body through the powers, as well as through the senses; yet since these are the duties of the living, who can doubt that these things pertain rather to the soul? When, therefore, we see greater strength in young children than in infants, and then adolescents and youths show greater strength day by day, until they diminish again with the aging of the body; not lightly, as it seems to me, it is a sign of growing with the body, and then of the aging of the soul.

...exercise...

21. 36. A. What you say is not at all absurd: but I tend to think that strength lies not more in the size of the body and the growth of age, than in a certain exercise and confirmation of the limbs: so much so that I may prove it to you, I ask you whether one walks more persistently than another and do you think that you are less tired, that you have more strength?

E. I think so.

A. Why, then, as a child I made a much longer journey without fail, when I was engaged in the pursuit of hunting in walking, than as a youth I had contributed to other studies, in which I was more compelled to sit; if greater powers are to be attributed to the approaching age, and thereby to the growing of the soul? Then, in the bodies of the wrestlers themselves, the wrestlers examine very skilfully, not the bulk and size, but certain knots of the lizards, and the torn muscles, and every shape of the body that suits them, and from this they rather gather evidence of strength. All this, however, is of little avail, unless the strength of art and exercise be added. It has also often been seen that men of huge physique are outmatched by small and short ones, either in moving, or in carrying weights, or even in wrestling itself. For who is it unknown that any Olympian wears out on his journey faster than any merchant of the neighborhood, who can be struck with one of his fingers? Wherefore if we do not statistically call all the powers themselves, but others more suited to one another, great; and the features of bodies, and their shapes, are more important than their sizes; and if the exercises bring so much, as it is famously

believed, that a man, by lifting a small calf every day, made it so that even a bull could lift and bear it without feeling a greater burden, which was gradually added: by no means does the strength of a greater age mean that the soul has grown with the body.

... and the older ones suddenly...

22. 37. And if there is anything more, the larger bodies of animals have strength, precisely because they are larger; That reason is that, by the law of nature, smaller weights give way to larger ones, not only when they are brought to their proper place by a nod, as moist and earthly bodies in the middle place of the world itself, which is the lowest, and again airy and fiery upwards. but even with some cannonade, or throw, or impulse, or repulse, they are compelled to go by a foreign force, where they would not be carried voluntarily. For if you let go from a height, although at the same time, two stones of unequal size, the larger one will indeed reach the ground more quickly; but if a minor is subjected to it, and is inevitably occupied by it, it certainly yields, and at the same time is brought down to the ground. Likewise, if the greater is thrown from above, the smaller is thrown against the upward direction; where they meet, it is necessary that there should be a smaller repercussion and retreat. You do not think that this should happen because the smaller one was forced to go against nature in the sublime, while the other one sought his place with a greater impulse; cause the greater to be hurled into the heavens, and the smaller to be thrown down to meet the earth. Likewise, if both are hurled against each other, not by natural motion, but by two as if they were fighting in the field, they implode themselves in the middle space; Who would have doubted that the younger would rise to the greater, in that direction from which he and he were being carried? When these things are so, that is, when, as has been said, smaller weights give way to larger ones; however, it matters a great deal how much impetuousness they act in themselves: for if, with a greater impetuousness, the lesser one, as if fired by some powerful cannon, is inflicted upon the greater one, either loosely shot, or already languishing; although he rebounds from the same, he slows him down, or even acts backwards instead of blows and weights.

... they are controlled by the confirmation of the body and the nod of the soul...

22. 38. With these presupposed and understood, as far as the present business requires, see now those things which are called powers in animals, whether they agree with this reason: for who denies that the bodies of all animals are endowed with their own weight? The weight of the act of nod of the soul, by which it inclines, is worth a great deal in its own magnitude. But the nod of the soul, to move the weight of the body, uses the nerves as if they were cannons: but the nerves are vegetated and made more mobile by drought and controlled heat; against them the dampness weakens and weakens. And so in sleep, because the doctors say it is cold and moist, and they prove it, the limbs languish; and the effort of those who awaken is much weaker, and therefore nothing is more broken and energetic than the lethargic. But it is evident that some frenzied people, who are forced by vigils and

wine, and have acute fevers, that is, so many heats, and their nerves strain and endure too much, that they struggle with greater strength than they do in full health, and do many things, when their bodies are weakened and weakened by illness. If, therefore, both the nod of the soul, and a certain mechanism of the nerves, and the weight of the body rely on these which are called powers; the will presents a nod, which is more inclined by hope or boldness, but is resounded by fear, but much more by despair (for in fear, when there is some hope, more violent forces usually appear); a certain configuration of the machine coapts the body, the adjustment modifies the health, it strengthens the energy of exercise; the weight gives the quantity of the members, which age and nutrients compare, but nutrients alone restore them. He who prevails equally over all these, is to be admired for his strength, and one is so much weaker than another, the more these fail him. And it often happens that, with a stubborn nod, another with a better device, although he used a small body weight, overcomes another endowed with a greater mass. And again, it is sometimes of such a size, that, even if it is acted upon with a feebler effort, it nevertheless overwhelms a small adversary who leans on much more strongly. But when not the weight of the body, nor the control of the nerves, but the nod itself, that is, the mind gives way, so that the stronger is completely overcome by the weaker in every way, but still the timid by the bolder; I do not know whether it is to be attributed to strength. Unless one says that the soul has certain powers of its own, by which greater boldness or confidence is born to it: which are present in one, and absent in another, then it is understood how much the soul precedes its body, even in that which takes place through the body.

...even in a child...

22. 39. Wherefore, when a child is a child, he is the only one who is able to draw something or push him away; and the nerves, both because of the recent and less perfect confirmation, were incapacitated, and because of the humor which was exuberant at that age, and withered away because of no exercise; but let the weight be so small, that it does not press heavily upon an impact from another, and it is more suitable to receive than to bring trouble: who is there who sees that the years have contributed all these things that are lacking, and knows the strength given by them? Has the soul grown up, which makes use of these more and more important things, will it think rightly and prudently? For this man can, if he sees that some young man, whom he does not see with a veil, shoot small and light quills as loosely as he can with the bow, go not far, and soon fall back; and after a little while the arrows, now heavy with iron, covered with quills, and shot with the most intense strings, seek the farthest sky; and faith was made, that both were made by the equal effort of man; that he had grown up in such a short time, and that he was supposed to have increased in strength. What can be said more perversely?

... therefore the soul does not grow with the body.

22. 40. Then, if the soul grows, see how ignorant it is to believe that its growth depends on the strength of the body; not to believe in the abundance of doctrines; with them alone he will accommodate the nod, let him possess this alone. But if we

think that the soul grows, when it is added to the powers; it is supposed to decrease when it is lowered. But he is humbled in old age, he is humbled in the labor of studies; and in these times of doctrine they are wont to be built up and constructed; and in no way can anything be increased and diminished at the same time. Therefore there is no evidence of a growing soul, greater strength at an older age. Many other things can be said; but if you are already satisfied, I will use the method, so that we can pass on to other things.

E. But I am quite convinced that greater strength does not come from the fact that the soul has grown; for, to leave out other things which have been said in detail by you, madness and disease of the body increase the soul, when the body itself is diminished, not even the frenetic himself will say, to whom the strength they are much larger than they usually are in health, no one knows. Wherefore it seems to me that all that we marvel at is in the nerves, when, besides hope, strength is found in every one: why, I pray, do I now attack that to which I am wholly intent: why, if the soul, if it has not as great a space as the body, feels it everywhere when it is touched?

The sentient soul does not suffer with the body (23, 41 - 30, 61)

What is the meaning of...

23. 41. A. Come, indeed, let us proceed as you wish, but I need you much more attentively than you perhaps think you ought to be. Therefore, make sure that you are present as much as possible, and answer me what it seems to you to be this sense which the soul uses through the body: for it is already called sense by its proper name.

E. There are five senses I use to hear, to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, and to touch: I do not know what else to answer.

A. This division is very ancient, and generally celebrated in sermons. Now I would like it to be defined for me by you as to what sense itself is, so that all these things may be included in the same definition, and nothing else that is not sense may be understood in it: but if that is not possible, I do not urge anything. For that which is sufficient, you can surely either refute or prove my definition.

E. In this way perhaps I do not lack you, as far as I am able: for no, and this is always easy.

A. Pay attention then: for I think it is sensible not to hide from the soul what the body suffers.

E. I like this definition.

A. Be present therefore to this one as your own, and protect her, while she is rejected by me for a little while.

E. I will protect you, of course, if you help; if not at all, I am already displeased: for it has not seemed to you in vain to be rebuffed.

A. Do not depend too much on authority, especially mine, which is none; and what Horace says: Be wise and dare 3: lest reason subjugate you before fear.

E. I have absolutely nothing to fear, in whatever way the matter may proceed: for you will not allow me to err. But start now if you have something 4, so that you don't get tired by delaying rather than opposing.

... more closely investigated...

23. 42. A. Tell me then, what does your body suffer when you see me?

E. Anything is allowed at all: for my eyes, if I am not mistaken, are parts of my body; who, if they suffered nothing, how could I see you?

A. But it is not enough to persuade your eyes to suffer something, unless you also show what they suffer.

E. What, finally, but the very sight? for they see For if you had asked me what a sick person was suffering from, I would have answered sickness; what is desiring, desire; what fearing, fear; what is rejoicing, joy Why, then, to the question of what the seer suffers, should I not correctly answer the sight itself?

A. But he who rejoices feels joy. Or will you deny it?

E. No, I agree.

A. I would say this and other disturbances.

E. Yes, I have.

A. But whatever the eyes feel, this they see.

E. I would not give this in any way: for who can see pain, which the eyes often feel?

A. It appears that you are dealing with your eyes: you watch well. Therefore see whether, as he who rejoices in rejoicing, feels joy, so also he who sees in seeing feels what he sees.

E. Can it be otherwise?

A. But whatever the seer feels by seeing, that must also be seen.

E. It is not necessary: for what? if he feels love by seeing, does he also see love?

A. Most cautiously and shrewdly; I am glad that you are hard to decipher. But now pay attention: since it is established between us, not everything that the eyes perceive, nor everything that is felt by seeing, is seen; Do you think that this is at least true, all that seems to be felt?

E. Of course, unless I grant this, how can what we see be called sense?

A. What? all that we feel, do we not also suffer?

E. It is so.

A. Therefore, if everything we see, we feel, and everything we feel, we suffer; we suffer all that we see.

E. Resist nothing.

A. Then you father me, and I, in turn, you, when we see each other.

E. I think so, and reason urgently compels me to this.

Suffer that the soul is not hidden...

23. 43. A. Take the rest: for I believe it will seem most absurd and foolish to you, if someone affirms that you suffer some body there, where it is not the body itself that you suffer.

E. It seems absurd, and I think it is so, as you say.

A. What is that? Is it not evident that my body is in another place, yours in another?

E. It is obvious.

A. Your eyes feel my body; and if they feel, they certainly suffer; nor can they suffer there, where that which they suffer is not; yet they are not there where my body is: therefore they suffer there where they are not.

E. I indeed conceded all those things, which I considered absurd not to concede: but this last thing that was done of them is so more absurd, that they gave me something at random, rather than agree that this is true: for to feel my eyes there where they are not. I did not even dare to say it in my dreams.

A. Look, then, where you fall asleep: for what would slip away from you more carelessly at last, if you were to wake up a little earlier?

E. In fact, I am diligently going over and turning over the same thing with myself: yet nothing shines enough to make him repent of having given me, except perhaps that which our eyes feel when we see: for perhaps he himself feels the sight.

A. No, it is so: for he stretches himself out, and flashes through his eyes, so that he can survey what we see farther in every direction. Hence it is that he sees rather there, where that which he sees is, and not whence he breaks out to see. Do you not see when you see me?

E. Who said this is crazy? I see at all, but I see through the eyes of a cast of eyes.

A. But if you see, you feel; if you feel, you suffer; nor can you suffer anything there, where you are not: but you see me there, where I am; Therefore, you will suffer there, where I am. But if where I am, you are not there; By what means you dare to say that I seem to be away from you, I do not know at all.

E. By sight, I say, I go straight to the place where you are, I see you where you are: but I confess that I am not there. But just as if I were to touch you with a rod, I would certainly touch you and feel it; and yet I would not be there where I would touch you: so that I say that I see myself with a sight, although I am not there, I am not compelled from that to confess that I am not the one who sees.

... it happens where there are no eyes.

23. 44. A. You have therefore allowed nothing to be taken at random: for even your eyes can be protected in this way, whose sight is like a rod, as you say; nor is it an absurd conclusion that your eyes see where they are not. Or does it seem different to you?

E. Of course it is so as you say: for I also noticed that now, that if they could see where the eyes are there, they would also see themselves.

A. You would rather say no, even to themselves; but they could only see themselves. For where they are, that is, the place they hold, they hold alone; nor is there a nose where they are, nor anything that is close to them: otherwise you would also be there where I am; because we are next to each other. These things being so, if they could only see where their eyes are, they would see nothing more than themselves. But when they do not see themselves, we are not only forced to agree that we can see them where they are not; but also that they cannot be at all, except where they are not.

E. There is nothing that makes me doubt this.

A. Therefore you do not hesitate to suffer them there, where they are not. For where they see, there they feel: for to see is to feel; but to feel, to suffer: wherefore where they feel, there they suffer. But they see elsewhere than where they are: therefore they suffer there, where they are not.

E. It is surprising how true I think these things are.

Therefore seeing is one thing to know another.

24. 45. A. Perhaps you think correctly. But answer me, I pray thee, whether we see all that we know by sight.

E. I believe so.

A. Do you also believe that all that we know by seeing, we know by sight?

E. And I believe this.

A. Why, then, usually by seeing smoke only, do we know the fire underneath, which we do not see?

E. You say the truth: and I no longer think that we can see whatever we know by sight: for, as you have taught, we can, by seeing something, know something else that has not been touched by sight.

A. What? Can we not see what we perceive by sight?

E. No way.

A. So it is one thing to feel, another thing to know.

E. Quite another thing: for we feel the smoke which we see; and from it we know that there is a fire which we do not see.

A. You understand well. But you certainly see that when this happens, our body, that is, our eyes, suffer nothing from the fire, but from the smoke which they only see. Indeed, to see, to feel; and to feel, to suffer, we have already agreed above.

E. I hold and agree.

A. When, therefore, something is not hidden from the soul through the passion of the body, the sense is not immediately called one of the five mentioned; but when the passion itself is not hidden: for that fire is not seen, nor heard, nor smelled, nor tasted, nor touched by us, yet it does not hide the soul when it is seen by smoke. And since this is not aside, the sense must not be called, because the body suffered nothing from the fire; yet it is called knowledge by the sense, because it is inferred and discovered from the passion of the body, although it is different, that is, from the vision of another thing.

E. I understand, and I see very well that this agrees with and favors that definition of yours, which you have given me to defend mine: for I remember that the sense is thus defined by you, when the soul does not hide what the body suffers. Therefore, that which appears to be smoke, we call sense; For the eyes, which are the parts and bodies of the body, suffered in seeing him: but the fire, from which no body suffered, although it was known, we do not call sense.

It is to suffer that hides the soul.

24. 46. A. I will indeed prove your memory and your following understanding; the true fortification of that definition falters.

E. Why please?

A. Because you do not deny, as I think, that the body suffers something when we grow or grow old: nor is it evident that we feel this in any sense; nor does this hide the soul. Therefore it is not concealed by something which the body suffers, nor can it be called this sense. For by seeing greater things which we had once seen smaller, and by seeing old men, it is evident that they were young and children; We suspect that our bodies are undergoing some such change even now as we speak. Nor are we mistaken in this, as I think: for I am more inclined to say that I am deceived by what I see, than that I understand that my hair is now growing, or that my body is changing in moments. But if this change is a passion of the body, which no one denies, it is not felt by us now, and yet it does not hide the soul, because it does not hide us; as I have said, the body which does not conceal the soul is tolerated, and yet neither is the sense. Why that definition, which had to include nothing that was not sense, when it included this, is certainly flawed.

E. I see that there is nothing left for me, but to ask you to either define it differently, or to repeat this, if you can: for I cannot deny that it is faulty on the basis of this argument which I vehemently prove.

A. It is easy to correct this, which I want you to dare to do: for you will do it, believe me, if you have understood well where he sins.

E. Did it take hold elsewhere than where it was foreign?

A. In what way?

E. Because the body grows old, although it is young, it cannot be denied that it suffers something; and when we know this, something that the body suffers is not hidden from the soul, nor can it be perceived by any sense: for I neither see myself growing old, nor do I feel it by hearing, or smelling, or tasting, or touching.

A. Then how do you know that?

E. I gather that reason.

A. What arguments is your argument based on?

E. That I see other old men who, like myself now, were young.

A. Is not the sense in which you see them one out of five?

E. Who denies? But from what I see of them, I guess I'm getting old too when I don't see it.

A. What words, then, do you think should be added to that definition by which it should be completed? since there is no sense, unless the soul is hidden by the

passion of the body, and yet not so that it understands it through another passion, or through any other thing?

E. Please say that a little more clearly.

Which is the true definition of reason.

25. 47. A. I will behave to you more willingly, and much more willingly to delay than to hasten: but do it fully present; for this will be good for what I have to say. A definition contains nothing less, nothing more, than what it has been undertaken to explain; otherwise it is completely defective. But whether he is free from such vices is examined by conversion: which will become more open to you by these examples. For if you were to ask me what man was, and I were to define him in this way, Man is a mortal animal; not immediately because the truth has been said, you ought also to prove the definition, but with the particle superimposed upon it, that is, every, to turn it over and look whether it was also true when turned: that is, whether, as it is true, every man is a mortal animal; If it were so true, every mortal animal is a man. for not only man is a mortal animal, but also every animal. Therefore, this definition of man is usually completed when the rational is added to the mortal: for man is a rational mortal animal; and as every man is a rational mortal animal, so every rational animal is a mortal man. Therefore, by containing more, the higher definition was defective, for it contained the beast with man: the latter is perfect; for he holds every man, and nothing more than man. But holding less, it is so faulty if you add grammar; for although every rational mortal animal is a grammarian man, yet the majority of men who are not grammarians are not contained in this definition: and for this reason it is false by that first statement; but when it is converted, it is true. For it is false, every man is a rational mortal grammatical animal; but it is true that every rational mortal animal is a grammatical human being. But since it is true neither by the first statement nor by conversion, it is certainly more vicious than these two: as these two are, man is a white animal; or, man is a four-legged animal. For even if you say, every man is a white animal; or a four-legged animal, you say falsely; and if you turn But they differ in this, that the former falls on some men; for most people are fair-skinned: the latter is for no one, for no man has four legs. You will learn these definitions for the time to explore, how they are judged by proposition and conversion: there are many other things of this kind that will be taught, and full and dark words, which I will try to learn little by little, where it seems appropriate.

What is meaning is asked...

25. 48. Now turn your attention to that definition of ours, and when you have discussed it more expertly, correct it: for we found that, when the definition was sense, it included something else which was not sense, and therefore was not, when it was converted, true. For perhaps it is true, that every sense is a passion of the body, not concealing the soul; as it is true, every man is a mortal animal: but as it is false, every mortal animal is a man, because that is also a beast; so it is false, every passion of the body, not concealing the soul, is sense; because now our nails are

growing, and the soul is not hidden, for we know that; we do not feel it, but know it by conjecture. In the same way, then, that the definition of man might be perfected, the rational was added, by which addition, beasts, which were included together, were excluded, and we comprehend nothing but man and every man by such a definition; Do you not think that something must also be added to this, whereby that which holds the foreign thing is separated from it, and nothing in it but sense, and all sense is understood?

E. I think so, but I do not know what can be added.

A. Certainly every passion of the body does not conceal the soul: but this statement cannot be reversed, because of that passion of the body, by which it either increases or decreases to those who know us, that is, so that it does not conceal the soul.

E. It is so.

A. What? Does not this passion hide the soul by itself, or by something else?

E. In another way: for it is one thing to see the nails grow, and another thing to know that they grow.

A. Since, therefore, the passion itself is to grow, which we do not perceive by any sense, but the greatness which we feel is made by the same passion, it is not the passion itself; It is clear that we know such a passion not by itself, but by something else. If, then, the soul did not hide itself through something else, would it not be felt rather than guessed?

E. I understand.

A. Why then do you doubt what should be added to that definition?

E. Now I see that it must be defined in this way, that sense is the passion of the body by itself, not concealing the soul: for all sense is this, and all this, as I think, is sense.

... and corrected.

25. 49. A. If this is so, I admit that the definition is perfect. But let us test it, if it pleases, whether it does not falter by that second fault, to which that of the man to whom the grammarian has been added. For you must remember that man is said to be a rational mortal grammatical animal; and thereby to sin that definition, which is true in the conversion, when it is false in the first statement. For it is false that every man is a rational mortal grammatical animal, although it is true that every rational mortal mortal animal is a grammatical man. Therefore, this definition is flawed, because it holds nothing but man, but not every man: and this is perhaps such as we boast of as being perfect. For although every passion of the body is by itself a sense not concealing the soul, yet not every sense is this. It is true that you understand this; namely, beasts feel, and almost all five of them thrive on these senses, as much as each is given by nature. Or will you deny it?

E. Nothing less.

26. 49. A. What? do you not admit that there is no knowledge except when a thing has been perceived and known by some firm reason?

E. I agree.

A. But the beast does not use reason .

E. And I grant this.

A. Knowledge therefore does not fall into the beast. But when something is not hidden , it is certainly known; Therefore animals do not feel, if all sense is with the passion of the body by itself does not hide the soul: but they feel, as was granted a little before: why then do we hesitate to disprove that definition, which could not in the least encompass all sense, since the sense of animals is excluded?

Knowing what to have perceived...

26. 50. E. I confess that I was deceived when I granted you that knowledge is then when something is perceived by sound reason. For I looked only at men when you asked this: for I can neither say that animals use reason, nor can I deny them knowledge. For he knew, as I think, his master the dog, whom he is said to have recognized after twenty years, 5 to say nothing of innumerable others.

A. Tell me, I beseech you, if two certain things are proposed to you, one to be reached, the other through which you can reach; which of these do you value most, and which do you prefer?

E. Who doubts that it should be accomplished as it should be?

and reason are two things , do we arrive at reason through science, or through reason at science?

E. Both things, as far as I think, are so connected that the other can be reached through the one. For we would not arrive at the reason itself unless we knew that it was to be arrived at. Therefore, science preceded it, so that we could arrive at reason through it.

A. What? to the very science which you say precedes, is it arrived at without reason?

E. I would never have said this: for such is the utmost rashness.

A. By reason then?

E. It is not so.

A. Then by recklessness?

E. Who said this?

A. By what then?

E. By nothing, because knowledge is innate in us.

... such a strong system...

26. 51. A. You seem to me to have forgotten what was agreed upon between us above, when I asked whether you thought that there is knowledge when something is perceived by a firm reason. For you answered, as I think, that this seemed to you human knowledge: but now you say that a man can have some knowledge, when he perceives the matter by no reason. Now who does not see that nothing is more adverse to him than these two things: and that there is no knowledge except when a thing is perceived by some firm reason; and that there is knowledge of a certain thing by no means of perception. Therefore I wish to know whether you choose these; for both can by no means be true.

E. I choose this which I said a little before: for I confess that I gave it above at random. For when we reason among ourselves we seek the truth, and this is done by asking and answering; how could he arrive at the sum which concludes the argument, unless something was first conceded? But I conceded, rightly, who could do what was not known? Thus this reason, unless it found something known in me, on which it would lean to lead to the unknown; I would learn nothing at all by it, and I would not name it a method at all. Wherefore in vain do you not agree with me that prior to reason there must necessarily be some knowledge in us, from which reason itself takes its beginning.

A. I will give you a custom, and indeed I will permit you to make amends as I have prescribed, whenever you regret something given to you: but do not, I beseech you, abuse this permission, and pay attention negligently when I ask; lest the constant ill-granted forces force you to doubt even about those things which are well-granted.

E. Go rather to the rest: for although I add to my vigilance whatever I can (for I too am ashamed of falling from my judgment so often), yet I will never be deterred by this shame from resisting, and correcting my fall, giving you especially a hand. For that is not why obstinacy is to be accepted, because constancy is to be desired.

... which reasoning pursues.

27. 52. A. Let this constancy appear to you as soon as possible: thus you have put forward the opinion which pleases me. But now I am as close as possible to those

things that I want. For I ask you what seems to you to be the difference between reason and reasoning.

E. I am not strong enough to distinguish these things.

A. Look at this, then, whether you think that a man who is already a youth, or a man, or (to remove all ambiguity) a wise man, has reason without interruption, while he is healthy in mind, just as good health is in the body, while it is free from plague and wounds; or like walking, sitting, talking, just being present, just missing.

E. I always think that there is reason in a healthy mind.

A. What is this? while by means of things which are granted and manifest, or by asking another, or by connecting other things, we bring ourselves to the knowledge of something; Does it seem to you that either we, or any wise man, always do it?

E. Not always: for it is not always that any man, or wise man, as far as I think, seeks something by arguing with himself or with another: for he who seeks, has not yet found; so if he always seeks, he never finds. But the wise man has already found, to say nothing else, the very wisdom which, when he was a fool, he sought perhaps by arguing, or in any other way he could.

A. You say rightly: why I want you to understand that there is no such reason, as long as we are led to something unknown by those things which are granted and known: for this is not always, as we have already agreed, present in a healthy mind; but reason always

Knowledge is more important than reason...

27. 53. E. I understand; but why?

A. Because you said a little before, that is why I must agree with you that we have knowledge before reason, which rests on something known, while reason leads us to the unknown: but now we find that it is not called reason while this is going on; for a healthy mind does not always do this, when it always has reason; but perhaps this reasoning is rightly named; so that reason is a certain aspect of the mind, and reasoning is the investigation of reason, that is, the aspect of it, through the things that are to be looked at, the movement. Wherefore these things are necessary to be sought, and those to be seen. And so when that aspect of the mind, which we call reason, being thrown into some thing, sees it, it is called knowledge; it is called ignorance or ignorance. For not even with these corporeal eyes does everyone who looks see; which we notice very easily in the dark. From which it is clear, as I think, that there is one thing to look at, and another to see; which two in the mind we call reason and knowledge. Unless something moves you against these things, or you consider them to be a little distinctly distinct.

E. I like this distinction, and I gladly agree.

A. See now, then, whether you think to look at us, that we may see; or to see, that we may look.

E. From this, not even a blind person doubts that sight is due to vision, and not vision due to sight.

A. We must therefore admit that vision is more important than appearance.

E. It must be admitted at all.

A. Therefore, knowledge is more valuable than reason.

E. I see the result.

A. Do you like animals to be better or happier than humans?

E. May God avert such monstrous madness.

A. Of course you were rightly frightened; but your opinion compels us to this: for you have said that they have knowledge, and not reason. But man has reason, by which knowledge is scarcely attained. But I must grant that it is easily reached; What will reason help us, so that we think ourselves ahead of the beasts, when they have knowledge, and this has been found to be more important than reason?

... and those beasts are lacking.

28. 54. E. I am absolutely compelled, either not to grant knowledge to beasts , or to refuse nothing, unless they are deservedly preferred to me. But please explain what I have mentioned about the dog Ulysses, for I was moved by his surprise and barked so vainly.

A. Now what do you think this is, but a certain force of feeling, not of knowing? For many beasts surpass us in sense, the cause of which is not the place here to inquire; But in mind, reason, and knowledge, God has placed us before them. But that sense can discern the things in which such souls are delighted, by approaching the habit of which it is a great power; and all the more easily, because the soul of beasts is more attached to the body, whose senses are those which it uses for sustenance and pleasure, which it takes from that same body. But the human soul, by reason and knowledge, of which we are speaking, because these are far superior to the senses, suspends itself from the body as much as it can, and that which is within, enjoys pleasure more willingly; and the more it declines in sense, the more it makes man resemble a beast. Hence it is that even wandering children, the more alienated they are from reason, so much the more easily do they distinguish by sense even the contact and union of their nurses, and cannot bear the smell of others with whom they have not been accustomed.

We owe it to ourselves and to God.

28. 55. Wherefore, although one thing has arisen from another, I still gladly dwell on that discourse, by which the soul is admonished not to refound itself in the senses beyond what necessity compels; but he should rather gather from these to himself, and restore to God: which is to become a new man, by putting off the old; from which to begin, because of the disregard of the law of God, there is a certain necessity, from which nothing of the divine Scriptures is contained, neither truer nor more secret. Here I would like to say more, and to constrain myself, while I seem to command you, to do nothing else than to repay me, to whom I owe myself most;

A servant friend of the Lord 6.

This cannot be done at all unless we are reformed to his image, which he gave us as something most precious and dearest to keep, while he gave us ourselves such that nothing can be placed before him. But nothing seems to me more laborious than this action, and nothing is more like cessation: yet the mind cannot undertake or fill it, except by the very helper to whom it is rendered. Hence it is that man must be reformed by his mercy, by whose goodness and power he was formed.

Again, what is meaning is examined.

28. 56. But we are forced to return to the purpose. Wherefore see whether it has already been proved to you that beasts have no knowledge, and all that, as an image of knowledge, which we marvel at, is the power of feeling.

E. Proven of course; and if there is anything to be inquired about more carefully, I will occupy another time: now I desire to know what you will do from here.

29. 56. A. What else do you think but that definition of sense, which formerly included what I know not what more than sense, so now totters by the contrary vice, that it could not include all sense? For they have the sense of beasts, and they have no knowledge: but whatever is not hidden is known; and everything that is known certainly belongs to science. About all of which I already agree with you. Either, then, it is not true that sense is a passion of the body, not hidden in the soul; or beasts lack it, because they lack knowledge: but we grant sense to beasts: therefore that definition is faulty.

E. I confess that I find nothing to resist.

Science is not side by side with reason...

29. 57. A. Take another, which makes us more ashamed of this definition. For you remembered, as I think, the third defect of definition pointed out to you, by which

absolutely nothing is baser; when it is true from neither side, such as that of man, man is a four-legged animal: for either, every man is a four-legged animal; or, every four-legged man is a man who says and affirms, he is certainly mad, if he is not joking.

E. You speak the truth.

A. What? if even in this vice of ours we are caught, do you think that there is anything more that should be exploded and exterminated from the soul?

E. Who will deny it? But I do not wish, if possible, to be detained here so long, and to be agitated with questions.

A. There is nothing to be afraid of, for the task is already finished: are you not yet convinced that, when it comes to the difference between beasts and men, it is one thing to feel, and another thing to know?

E. No, most of all.

A. Sense, then, is one thing, knowledge another.

E. It is so.

A. But we do not feel by reason, but by sight, or hearing, or smell, or taste, or touch.

E. I agree.

A. And all that we know, we know by reason: therefore no sense is knowledge. But whatever is not hidden belongs to knowledge: therefore it belongs to no sense not to hide, as no man can rightly be said to be four-legged. Wherefore, having accepted this definition of ours, it is concluded that yours not only invaded foreign territories, and did not leave anything of their own, but that they had nothing of their own at all, and that they occupied all that was foreign.

E. What shall we do then? Will you allow her to leave the court like this? For although I had offered him such a defense as I could, yet you composed the very formula of the suit which deceived us. And indeed, although I could not obtain it, I was present in good faith, which is enough for me: but you, if you accuse me of trespass, what do you do, by whom she was produced to remonstrate boldly, and attacked so that she shamefully yielded?

A. Is there any judge here, from whom this man or I should be afraid? I wanted to refer you privately as an employed lawyer, for the purpose of instruction, so that when it comes to judgment, you may be ready to assist.

29. 58. E. Is there, then, anything that you can bring forward for these things, which you recommend to me to be defended and protected at random by the weakest?

A. It certainly is.

... by itself there is no other meaning.

30. 58. E. What is that, please?

A. Because although sense is one thing, knowledge another, yet this is not on either side common to both; so that man and beasts themselves, though they differ greatly, yet have in common the fact that they are animals. For whatever appears to the soul is not hidden , either through the moderation of the body or through the purity of the understanding; and the former sense claimed for itself, and the latter science claimed for itself.

E. So that definition remains safe and proven?

A. It remains true.

E. Where then have I been deceived?

A. When I asked whether everything that is not hidden should be known: for you agreed to this request at random.

E. For what would you have me say?

A. Knowledge does not immediately exist if something is not hidden, but if it is not hidden by reason: and since it is not hidden by the body, it is called sense, if the passion of the body is not hidden by itself. Do you not know that certain philosophers and learned men have thought that even what is comprehended by the mind cannot aspire to the name of science, unless the comprehension is so firm that the mind cannot be moved from it by any reason?

What allows the body not to hide the soul...

30. 59. E. I accept these with great pleasure: but I beg you, since what the meaning is, has been explained as precisely as I think, let us return to that question, for the sake of which we undertook to explain this. For I had brought forward an argument by which I would prove that the soul is as great as its body, by the fact that the tip of the toe feels the touch from the head to the foot in whatever direction you touch; and thence we are brought to the most complete definition of the senses, but perhaps not necessarily. Therefore, if it pleases you, show me the very fruit of this great work.

A. It is absolutely, and very abundant; for all that we sought was accomplished. For if the sense is that the passion of the body by itself does not conceal the soul, that we might hold it most firmly, we have conversed longer than you wished; do you remember that at last we found that there we felt eyes where they were not, or rather suffered there?

E. I remember.

A. You also gave it, if I am not mistaken, and you do not doubt that it should have been given, that the soul is much better and more powerful than the whole body.

E. I think it is wrong to doubt this.

A. Now, if the body can suffer something there where it is not, because of a certain harmony with the soul, which has been found to happen to the eyes in seeing; Do we think that the soul is so thick and sluggish, through which the eyes themselves can only hide it from the passion of the body, if it does not lie there, where the passion itself occurs?

... it happens where there are no eyes...

30. 60. E. This conclusion moves me a great deal, and so much that I am completely astonished, and not only do not know what to answer, but exactly where I am. What shall I say? that there is no sense, since the passion of the body does not hide the soul by itself? what else will there be, if not this? Do the eyes suffer when we see? it is most absurd. Where are they suffering there? but they do not see themselves, nor where they are there is anything besides themselves. Are not the eyes more powerful than the soul, since they have the same power? nothing is more insane. Or is this to be said, that it is more powerful to suffer there, where there is something, than where it is not? but if this were true, sight would not be superior to the other senses.

A. What if any blow, or falling of any kind, or perturbation of the humours, when the eyes suffer there where they are; This does not hide the soul, nor does this passion hide the sight, but is called the touch: and yet the eye could suffer such things even in an inanimate body, although the soul was lacking, which the passion did not hide. but that which the eye cannot suffer unless the soul is present, that is what is suffered by seeing, is this only tolerated there, where it is not? Whence does it not appear to anyone that the soul is contained in no place? For the eye, which is a body, does not suffer that in its place, which it would never suffer without a soul.

... then the soul is not in place.

30. 61. E. What shall I do, I pray thee? Can it not be concluded by these reasons that our souls are not in our bodies? and if so, do I not know where I am? For who will rescue me, since I myself am a soul?

A. Don't be disturbed, and rather be in good spirits. For this thought and consideration invites us to ourselves, and as much as possible pulls us away from the body. But what has seemed to you, that the soul is not in the body of an animate being, though it may seem absurd, yet there have not been the most learned men to whom it pleased, nor do I now think that there is a lack; it is enough to be cleaned. Now rather pay attention to what else you bring to convince you that the soul is

either long or broad, or something of the like. now that you have nothing to bring, let us see what remains.

Is the soul divided into parts (31, 62 - 32, 69)

He tells about a certain worm.

31. 62. E. I should perhaps have nothing, if I remembered how much we as children were wont to marvel at the throbbing tails of lizards severed from the rest of the body; I cannot by any means convince myself that this motion can take place without the soul: nor by what agreement should it take place, so that there is no space for the soul, when it can be severed even with the body, I understand.

A. I could answer air and fire, which two are held by the presence of the soul in the earthy and moist body, so that all four may be balanced, while after the departure of the same soul they escape to the heavens, and prepare themselves to move those bodies so much more excitedly, the more suddenly they break out in a recent stroke : then the motion continues to languish, and at last to cease, while it becomes less and less what escapes, and then the whole flies away. But he recalls me from this because I drew these eyes almost later than can be believed; but certainly not later than I ought. For when we were lately in the country of Liguria, those young men of ours, who were then with me for the sake of their studies, noticed, lying on the ground in a dark place, a crawling multi-footed beast, I say a certain long worm; For with a stroke of the style which one of them happened to have, he struck the animal in the middle: then both parts of the body departed from that wound in opposite directions, with as much swiftness of foot, and with no feebler effort, than if there were two animals of this kind. Terrified by this miracle, and curious as to the cause, they eagerly brought those living pieces to us, where I and Alypius were sitting together. We were not a little moved, we saw that they could run in every direction on the board: and one of them, touched by their style, contorted itself to the place of pain, feeling nothing else, and performing its movements elsewhere. What more? We tried, as far as it was possible; and the worm, nay, we have already cut the worms into many parts: they all moved so that, unless it had been done by us, and fresh wounds appeared, as many of them had been born separately, and we would have believed each of them to have lived.

Which reasons are held not to be discarded...

31. 63. But then I am afraid to tell you what I said to those young men, when they looked intently at me; penetrated by a worm, it seems to have succumbed. But I ordered them to keep their course in their studies, just as they had begun; so that they would come at a more appropriate time to seek and learn these things, if the situation indicated that they would be. But what I talked about with Alypius when they were leaving, when each of us remembered and conjectured and asked if I wanted to explain, according to his own modus operandi; There are far more things

to be said to us than have been said from the very beginning with so many twists and turns: I will not, however, keep silent with you about what I feel. Unless at that time I already knew many things about the body, about the species that is in the body, about place, time, and motion, which are discussed in the most subtle and abstract way because of this very question; I would decline to give the palm to those who say that the body is the soul. Wherefore I exhort you, as I can, again and again, not to rush into the books or the discussions of the most eloquent men, and to throw yourself too much into the senses of those who believe in the body, until you have corrected and firm the steps which lead the soul to God himself, lest you should depart from that most secret and tranquil mind. the habitation from which now, while she dwells, she is a stranger, is more easily turned away by studies and labors, than by indolence and laziness.

... if for some reason it is hidden.

31. 64. But now take against that which, as I feel, you are much moved, not that it is stronger than many, but that it is shorter; not that I was more probable than the rest, but that I could choose more suitable for you.

E. Tell me, I pray you, as quickly as you can.

A. I say the first thing, if the cause is most obscure, why these things happen in the circumcision of certain bodies, we should not immediately be so disturbed by this one thing, that we should decide that so many things which have appeared to you in a brighter light above, are false. For it may be that the cause of this thing is hidden from us, which is hidden even from human nature; or it may be known to some man, and he cannot be questioned by us; or we ourselves are of such a genius, that he cannot satisfy us when asked. Is it from him that whatever we have most firmly learned from the opposite side, and which we confess to be the most true, ought to be slipped away from us and wrested from us? But if those things remain intact, which you answered to be certain and indubitable when asked; there is nothing to fear this worm childishly, although we are unable to give a reason for its vivacity and numerousness. For if it were evident to you that he was a good man, and that he was a good man, and that you should find him in a party of robbers, whom you were going to pursue, and that by any chance he should die before he could be questioned by you; you would think any reason for his association and conviviality with criminals, even if he always lurked behind you, than crime and society. Why, then, with so many arguments published above, and confirmed by you most firmly, has it occurred to you that the soul is contained in no other place, and because of this, that there is no such quantity as we see in bodies, do you suspect that there is some reason why some animal is cut up in all he lives in parts; but is it not that the soul could have been cut off with the body? But if we cannot find it, is it not better to ask what is true than to believe what is false?

A sound and a sign.

32. 65. Next I ask you whether you think that in our words the sound itself is one thing, and that which is signified by the sound is another.

E. I think both are the same.

A. Tell me, then, where the sound itself comes from when you speak.

E. Who doubts to proceed from me?

A. So the sun goes away from you while you name the sun?

E. You asked me about the sound, not about the thing itself.

A. So the sound is one thing, and the thing which the sound signifies is another thing: but you said that both are the same.

E. Now, I admit that the sound that signifies is one thing, and the thing that is signified is another.

A. Tell me, then, whether you, who knew the Latin language, could name the sun in speaking, if the understanding of the sun did not precede the sound.

E. No way I could.

A. What? before the very name proceeds from the mouth, if you wish to utter it, keep yourself in silence for a while; Does it not remain in your thoughts that someone else is going to hear it expressed in a voice?

E. It is obvious.

A. What? since the sun itself is of such greatness, can that idea of it, which you hold in thought before the voice, either long, or broad, or something of the like kind?

E. No way.

...split does not mean...

32. 66. A. Come, tell me now: when your very name bursts forth from your mouth, and I, hearing it, think of the sun, which you thought before the voice and with the voice itself, and now perhaps we both think; Does it not seem to you that the name itself seems to have received from you the meaning which it conveyed to me through the ears?

E. It seems

A. Since the name itself consists in sound and meaning, and the sound belongs to the ears, the meaning belongs to the mind; Do you not think that in a name, as in something animating, the sound is the body, and the meaning as the soul of the sound?

E. Nothing seems more like it to me.

A. Consider now whether the sound of a name can be divided by letters, while its soul, that is, its meaning, cannot. For it is she which a little while ago in our thought you answered neither broad nor long.

E. I completely agree.

A. What, when that sound is divided by each letter, does it seem to you to retain that meaning?

E. How can the individual letters signify what the name that consists of them signifies?

A. But when, in literature, the sound is torn apart with lost meaning; Do you think that anything else has happened, than that the soul has departed from the torn body, and that a certain death has happened to the name?

E. I not only agree, but so willingly, that nothing pleased me more in this discourse.

... if you accept the words whose parts...

32. 67. A. If, then, you have seen enough in this similitude, how can it be that the soul is not cut off from the body that is dissected? Now consider how the very parts of the body, when the soul is not cut off, can live. For you have already conceded, and rightly so, as I think, that the meaning which is as it were the soul of the sound, while the name is given, cannot be divided by itself by any agreement, since the sound itself, which is as it were its body, can. But in the name of the sun the sound was so divided that no part of it retained any meaning. And so we considered those letters, torn apart by the body of the name, as lifeless members, that is, lacking in meaning. Wherefore, if we find any name, which, when divided, may also signify something to each of its parts; you must grant that not every kind of death has been made with such precision, since the members, considered separately, will appear to you to have any signification and as if they were breathing.

E. I will grant it at all, and I beg you to sound the same now.

A. Take it: for while I was attending to the neighborhood of the sun, about whose name we spoke above, Lucifer met me; which, indeed, divided between the second and third syllables, signifies something in the former part, when we say, Luci, and therefore lives in this more than half of the body of the name. The last part also has a soul: for when you are ordered to carry something, you hear it. For who could you obey, if someone said to you, Bring the code, if it meant nothing? that when Lucifer is added, Lucifer sounds, and signifies a star; but when it is lowered, it signifies something, and for this reason it seems to retain life.

... they also mean torn.

32. 68. Now when there is a place and a time, by which all things that are felt are occupied, or rather what they occupy; what we perceive with our eyes, by place; which in the ears is divided by time. For that worm occupied more space as a whole than a part of it; thus there is a greater delay of time when Lucifer is spoken of than if only Lucius were spoken of. Why, if this meaning lives on in that diminution of time, which was made by the division of that sound, when the same meaning is not divided (for it was not itself stretched by time, but the sound); so it is to be supposed that, when the body of a worm is cut off, although a part lives in a smaller place in the very place in which it was a part, the soul is not completely cut off, nor is it made smaller in a smaller place, although the entire living being has all its members extended through a larger place at the same time. For it held not the place itself, but the body which was acted upon by it: just as that signification was not extended through time, yet all the letters of the name possessing their own delays and times, had, as it were, animated and completed them. In the meantime I beg you to be content with this similitude, with which I feel you are pleased. But these things may be discussed in the most precise manner, so that, not with similitudes, which generally fail, but with the facts themselves, it may be enough, that you may not wait for the present: for so long a discourse must be concluded, and many other things which are lacking to you, the mind must be cultivated to look at and consider these things. , so that you may understand very clearly whether what is said by some of the most learned men is so to be held, that the soul can in no way be divided by itself, but nevertheless can be divided by the body.

One or many souls?

32. 69. Now receive from me, if you will, or rather recognize through me, how great the soul is, not in the space of place and time, but in force and power: for if you remember thus, it has long been intended and distributed to us. As for the number of souls, I do not know what to answer you, since you thought that this pertains to that question: for I would sooner say that it is not to be asked at all, or at least to be deferred to you now, than that either the number and the multitude do not belong to the quantity, or that the question is so wrapped up that I have just put it to you. to be able to be expedient For if I say that there is one soul, you will be troubled, because in one it is happy, in another miserable; nor can one thing be both happy and miserable at the same time. If I say that it is one and many at the same time, you will laugh; nor is it easy for me to suppress your laughter. If I only say that there are many, I shall laugh at myself, and bear myself less displeasing to myself than to you. Hear, then, that I promise that you will be able to hear well from me; which, in truth, is so burdensome to either of us, or to one of us, that perhaps it overwhelms you, so that you do not wish to undergo or impose it.

E. I yield completely, and what seems to you to be agreeable to me can be done, as much as my soul is worth, I await your explanation.

The seven degrees show how great the soul is (33, 70 - 36, 81)

It provides life and animation.

33. 70. A. O that we could both ask some very learned person, not only that, but also the most eloquent, and altogether the wisest, most perfect man about this! How could he explain by saying and disputing what the soul was capable of in the body, what in itself, what with God, to whom it is most holy, and in whom it has its highest and all good! And now, since I lack another for this matter, I dare say you do not lack: but this is the reward, that while, what is the value of the soul, I am uneducated; I will try to make myself secure. In the first place, however, I am going to give you a very broad and infinite expectation, lest you think that I am speaking of every soul, but only of the human one, which alone we have to take care of, if we are to take care of ourselves. These things, therefore, first, as it is easy for anyone to notice, vivify this earthly and mortal body by its presence; it collects into one, and holds in one, it does not allow it to flow out or become congested; He distributes the food equally among the members, giving to each of them his income; it preserves its congruity and manner, not only in beauty, but also in growth and reproduction. But these things also seem to be common to man with trees: for these things also we say live, and in their true nature we see and admit that they are preserved, grow, and reproduce.

Sensation and appetite.

33. 71. So ascend the second step, and see what the soul can do in the senses, where life is understood more clearly and manifestly. For I don't know what impiety is plainly rustic, and more wooden than the very trees which it gives shelter to, which pains the vine when the grapes are picked, and not only feels them when they are cut down, but also believes it sees and hears: about which sacrilegious error there is another place to discuss . Now, what I have established, consider what is the power of the soul in the senses, and in the very movement of the more manifest soul, of which there can be no communion with those which are fixed to us at the roots. The soul concentrates itself on touch, and by it it feels and distinguishes hot, cold, rough, soft, hard, soft, light, heavy. Then he judges the innumerable differences of tastes, smells, sounds, and forms by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. And in all these he learns and desires those things which are according to the nature of his body; He rejects and flees the contrary. He withdraws himself from these senses at certain intervals of time, and repairing their movements as if on a certain holiday, he turns with him the images of the things which he has drawn through them, in groups and in multiples, and this is all sleep and dreams. He also often delights in gesturing and wandering with ease of movement, and without effort arranges the harmony of the limbs; for the union of the sexes he does what he can, and strives to be one in his double nature, society and love. He conspires with the unborn not only to beget, but also to foster, protect, and feed them. The things between which the body acts, and by which the body sustains itself, are attached by habit, and are painstakingly separated from them, as if they were members: which force of habit, even by the separation of the things themselves , and not separated

by the interval of time, is called memory. But again, no one denies that all these things are possible even in the wild.

Skills and discipline.

33. 72. Therefore raise to the third degree, which is already proper to man, and think of the memory, not of the uninitiated by custom, but of the innumerable things commended and retained by the observation and signs, so many arts of the workmen, the worship of the fields, the construction of cities, various buildings, and many kinds of miracles; the discoveries of so many signs in letters, in words, in gestures, in every kind of sound, in pictures and figures; so many languages of nations, so many established, so many new, so many established; only the number of books, and monuments of every kind to preserve the memory, and so much concern for posterity; the orders of offices, powers, honors, and dignities, whether in families, or at home, and in the military in the republic, or in profane, or in sacred apparatuses; the power of reasoning and devising, the rivers of eloquence, the varieties of poems, the myriads of simulations for play and fun, the skill of modulation, the subtlety of learning, the discipline of counting, the conjecture of the past and the future from the present. This is great and completely human. But there is still this common abundance of partly learned and unlearned, partly good and bad souls.

Purifications and virtues.

33. 73. Look up, therefore, and leap to the fourth degree, from which goodness begins, and all true praise. For hence the soul dares not only to its own, if it acts as a part of the whole, but to itself also to the whole body, and does not consider its goods as its own, and discriminates and despises them when compared with its own power and beauty; with filth, and to make the whole whole clean and tidy; to fortify oneself against everything that tries to divert one from one's purpose and opinion; to value human society, and to wish nothing to another that he does not wish to happen to himself; to follow the authority and precepts of the wise, and by these words to believe God to himself. In this so excellent act of the soul there is still labor, and against the troubles and flatteries of this world a great and most intense conflict. For in the very business of purification there is a fear of death, often not great, but often very intense: not great, and when it is strongly believed (for to see whether this is true, it is only permissible for a purified soul) that all things are governed by God's providence and justice, so that no one can die unjustly. even though it may have been brought about by a wrongdoer. But death is vehemently feared at this stage, since it is also believed to be weaker, the more anxiously it is sought; and it seems to be the less, inasmuch as the calmness is less because of fear, which is necessary for the investigation of the darkest things. Then, as the soul feels more and more, the more it advances, the more there is between the pure and the contaminated; he fears all the more, lest, having been deposited with this body, God will be less able to bear it polluted than himself. But nothing is more difficult than to fear death, and to refrain from the temptations of this world, as the dangers themselves demand. However, the soul is so great that it can also do this with the

help of the justice of the supreme and true God, by which this universe is supported and governed; by which it also happened, that not only were all things, but they were so, that they could not be better at all. To whom he commits himself most piously and safely to help him in the difficult work of his purification.

Consistency and tranquility.

33. 74. When this will be effected, that is, when the soul has been freed from all corruption and stains, then it holds itself happily within itself, and does not fear anything at all for itself or for any of its own reasons. This, then, is the fifth degree: for it is one thing to effect, and another to maintain purity; and it is quite another action by which he restores himself that has been polluted, another by which he does not allow himself to be polluted again. At this level he conceives omnipotence as great as it is: when he has conceived, then he proceeds with a kind of immense and incredible confidence in God, that is, in the very contemplation of truth, and that, for which he has labored so much, the highest and most secret reward.

It leads to contemplation.

33. 75. But this action, that is, the desire to understand those things which are truly and supremely, is the highest aspect of the soul, in which it has no more perfect, better and more upright. This, then, will be the sixth step of action: for it is another thing to cleanse the very eye of the soul, so that it may not look in vain and at random, and see wrongly; it is another thing to preserve and strengthen health itself; another, to direct a clear and straight look at what is to be seen. Those who wish to do this before they have been cleansed and healed, let that light of truth reverberate in such a way that they think not only that there is nothing good in it, but also that there is a great deal of evil in it, and they reject the name of truth from it, and with a kind of lust and pitiful pleasure into their darkness. which their disease may suffer, let them flee cursing medicine. Whence it is said by divine inspiration, and in the most orderly way, by the Prophet: Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit in my bowels. He who is certainly not established in it, unless the heart has first been pure, that is, unless the thought itself has first restrained and filtered itself from all desire and dregs of mortal things.

It is firm in contemplation.

33. 76. Now in the very vision and contemplation of truth, which is the seventh and last step of the soul; no longer steps, but a kind of mansion, by which those steps are reached; what are the joys, what is the fruitfulness of the supreme and true good, the inspiration of whose serenity and eternity, what shall I say? They said these things, as they judged it necessary to say, certain great and incomparable souls, whom we believe they also saw and see. I now dare to tell you this plainly, that if we persevere in the course which God commands us, and which we have undertaken to hold, we shall, by the power and wisdom of God, arrive at that supreme cause,

or the supreme author, or the supreme principle of all things, or if in some other way such a thing may be more aptly called: when we understand this , we shall truly see what is the vanity of those who are vain under the sun. or both are understood. However, it is possible to recognize how far there is between these things and what they really are; and how, nevertheless, all these things were created by God, and in their comparison they are nothing; considered in itself, wonderful and beautiful. Then let us recognize what truths we have been commanded to believe, and how well and healthily we have been nourished by the mother Church, what is the usefulness of that milk which the Apostle Paul preached that he gave himself to little children to drink, 9 that it is most useful to receive food when one is nourished by his mother; when it is already great, to be ashamed: to reject when it is necessary, to be pitied; sometimes to criticize or to hate, of crime and impiety; but to handle and administer comfortably, is the most full of praise and charity. We shall also see so many changes and vicissitudes of this corporeal nature, while it serves the divine laws, that even the resurrection of the flesh itself, which is partly slower, partly not believed at all, we should hold so certain, that it is not more certain for us, that the sun will rise when it dies. But now those who, as an example of our salvation and the firstfruits, were taken up by the most powerful, eternal, unchangeable Son of God, and that he was born of a virgin, and the rest of the miracles of this history, we should so despise, as we would those children who, with a painter, set out to look at the pictures, they saw him painting; they do not think that a man can be painted unless he who paints looks at another picture. But there is so much pleasure in contemplating the truth, no matter how many parts one can contemplate it, so much purity, so much sincerity, so much unquestionable faith in things, that sometimes someone thinks he did not know anything else, when he seemed to know it; and the less the soul is hindered from adhering to the whole truth, the death which was previously feared, that is, the flight and escape of all kinds from this body, is desired as the highest office.

Honor to be given to God alone.

34. 77. You have heard how great is the power and power of the soul: that I may sum up briefly, as it must be admitted, that the human soul is not what God is; so it is to be presumed that nothing among all that He has created is nearer to God. And therefore it is divinely and singularly handed down in the Catholic Church, that no creature should be worshiped by the soul (for I speak more willingly in these words in which these things were insinuated to me), but only the Creator of all things that are, from whom all things, through whom all things, in whom all things; that is, an unchangeable principle, unchangeable wisdom, unchangeable charity, one true and perfect God, who never was, never will be, never was otherwise, never will be otherwise; whereby nothing is more secret, nothing more present; who is difficult to find where he is, more difficult where he is not; with which not all can be, and without which no one can be: and if there is anything more incredible about it, yet we are able to say more suitable and suitable men. This alone, then, is the God of the soul to be worshipped, neither discretely nor confusedly. For whatever the soul worships as God, it must think that it is better than itself. But the nature of the soul is neither the earth, nor the seas, nor the stars, nor the moon, nor the sun, nor anything at all that can be touched, or can be seen with these eyes, not even that which cannot be seen by us, is to be believed to be better than heaven. Nay, reason

convinces us that all these things are far worse than any soul; if only true lovers would dare to follow her leading through certain unusual, and because of this difficult, conditions with the utmost perseverance and respect.

To help people.

34. 78. If indeed there is anything else in the nature of the world besides those which are known to the senses, and exactly which occupy a certain space of place, of which we have said that the human soul is superior to all of them; par: worse, as the soul of cattle; equal, like angels: but better, nothing. And if there is ever anything better than these, it is by his sin, not by nature. However, it does not become so much worse that the soul of the cattle should be preferred or contributed to it. Therefore God alone is to be worshipped, who alone is its author. But every other man, though the wisest and most perfect, or indeed any soul of reason and most blessed, is only to be loved and imitated, and to him, according to his merit and order, what befits him. For: You shall worship the Lord your God, and you shall serve Him alone. 10. But we should know that help is to be given to the erring kindred souls and those who are suffering, as much as is permitted and commanded, so that when this very thing is done well, we understand that God is acting through us. Nor shall we claim anything that belongs to us, deceived by the vain desire of glory, by which we sink from the top to the bottom with one evil. Not oppressed by vices, but vices themselves; nor do we hate the sinners, but the sins themselves. For we must wish to help all, even those who have hurt us, or want to hurt us, or want to be hurt at all. This is the truth, this is perfect, this is the only religion, by which it belongs to the soul, of which we are inquiring, to be reconciled to God, the greatness by which it makes itself worthy of freedom: for he frees from all, whom it is most profitable for all to serve, and in whose service the pleasure is perfect and it is the only freedom. But I see that I have almost exceeded the goals of my purpose, and have told you so much for so long without any question: I do not regret that. For since these are scattered throughout so many writings of the Church, although we seem to have collected them not inconveniently, yet they cannot be fully understood; unless everyone who acts bravely in the fourth degree of these seven, and preserves piety, and prepares for it the health and strength to be perceived, investigates everything in detail, most carefully and most shrewdly: for in all these degrees there is a distinct and proper beauty, which we better call acts

These things are explained in other words.

35. 79. For we are asking about the power of the soul, and it is possible for it to do all these things at the same time, but it seems that it only does what it does with difficulty, or at least with fear. For he does this much more attentively than the rest. Therefore, in ascending upwards, the first act, for the purpose of teaching, is called animation; the second, sense; thirdly, art; the fourth, virtue; fifth, tranquility; sixth, entry; seventh, contemplation. They can also be called in this way: of the body; through the body; around the body; to himself; in itself; to God; with God They can also be: beautifully about another; beautifully by another; nicely around another; beautiful to beautiful; beautiful in beautiful; beautiful for beauty; beautiful with

beauty About all of which you will ask later, if anything seems to be disclosed: now therefore I wanted to sign these terms so often, so that you will not be moved when others call the same names by other names, or even divide them in some other way; and because of this or that or that you are wicked. For in innumerable ways the same things can be both called and divided in the most precise and precise manner; but each one uses in such a multitude of ways that he considers himself to use them appropriately.

What is true is freedom and religion.

36. 80. God, therefore, by an inviolable and incorruptible law, by which he governs all that he has created, subjects the body and soul of the soul to himself, and thus all things to himself: he does not forsake her in any act, whether by punishment or reward. For he judged this to be the most beautiful thing, that whatever it is, it should be as it is; and it should be so ordered by the degrees of nature, that when considering the whole, no deformity should be found in any part; and every punishment and every reward of the soul will always contribute something in proportion to the just beauty and arrangement of all things. For the soul has been given free will, which those who try to undermine it with frivolous reasonings are so blind that they do not even understand that they are speaking of their own vain and sacrilegious will. And yet the free will is not given to the soul in such a way that whatever it tries to do, it disturbs any part of the divine order and law. For it was given by the wisest and most invincible Lord of all creation. But these things, as they are to be seen, are few; nor is anyone qualified for this except by true religion. For it is a true religion, by which the soul binds itself to one God, from whence it seemed to have broken away from sin, by reconciliation. In that third act, therefore, he enkindles the soul, and begins to lead; cleans in the fourth; he reformed in the fifth; introduces in the sixth; feeds in the seventh And this happens sometimes more quickly, sometimes more slowly, so that all things prevail with love and merits: yet God does all things most justly, most moderately, and most beautifully, in whatever way they choose to have themselves with whom He deals. Now, how far the consecrations of young children are of any use is a very obscure question, but it must be believed that they are of some use. He will find this reason, when it is necessary to seek it: although there are many other things that have long been sought for you some day, rather than known. This will be most useful, if they are required by the leader with piety.

For those who read.

36. 81. These things being so, who is there who is justly upset that by acting and managing the body the soul is given, when so great and so divine an order of things cannot be better connected; or he thinks that it is necessary to inquire what kind of person is to be accomplished in this mortal and frail body, since it has been condemned by right to death because of sin, and it can also excel here in virtue; or what will the body be like after this, when the punishment of death must necessarily remain for remaining sin, and for virtue and piety God himself, that is, truth itself, is the reward? Wherefore, if it now pleases us, let us end such a long discourse some

day, and pay the most vigilant and religious attention to the fulfillment of God's commandments: for there is no other escape from so many evils. But if anything has been said by me more obscurely than you would like, make sure that you require the order of memory at some other time more opportunely. For we who seek him will not lack him, who is the Master of all things from above.

E. But I, too, was so moved by this speech, that I thought it wrong to interrupt it; I will yield to your judgment, and henceforth to investigate such great things, I will not only have time for your occupations, but also myself more opportunely.

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